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1 
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY RESPONSES TO TAX 
AVOIDANCE: EXPLICATING AND EVALUATING THE 
ALTERNATIVES 
ERIK M. JENSEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Nothing is certain but death and taxes? Not true. If taxes are certain, then 
so too are tax avoidance, tax evasion, and governmental efforts to contain the 
avoidance and evasion.1 
This Article examines anti-avoidance efforts in the United States—in 
particular, legislative and regulatory responses to tax avoidance.2 To be sure, 
the judiciary has been involved as well, having developed many important 
anti-avoidance doctrines over the years. But judicial efforts are reactive, 
necessarily limited to disputes that reach the courts, and generalist judges can 
be overwhelmed by technical tax issues.3 In contrast, Congress and the Internal 
Revenue Service can look at the larger picture, systematically taking advantage 
of the learning of tax experts, and act preemptively.4 If judicial doctrines have 
significant prospective effect, it is because the Service invokes those doctrines 
in policing the system. 
Part I of the Article describes the avoidance problem and gives two 
examples of transactions that can be considered tax shelters—examples that 
will serve as test cases for the anti-avoidance methods discussed in the rest of 
the Article. The following parts of the Article consider the merits of several 
statutory and regulatory methods of dealing with shelters: enacting statutes or 
regulations aimed at particular avoidance transactions (Part II); enacting 
 
* Schott-van den Eynden Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. The author wishes 
to thank Patrick Driessen for comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. Attempts to avoid or evade death will always be with us as well, but, as far as I can tell, 
they will not succeed, at least not in the long run. 
 2. From now on, I will use only the term “avoidance.” For “evasion,” the illegal stuff, the 
substantive legal doctrines are, by definition, already in place. And, on the enforcement side, 
much of what I discuss in Parts VI and VII, dealing with disclosure and standards of practice, is 
just as relevant to evasion as to avoidance. 
 3. For that matter, even specialized judges, like those on the Tax Court, can be 
overwhelmed. 
 4. Congress is not made up of tax experts, of course, but the staffs of the congressional 
committees are first-rate. 
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“outcomes-oriented” legislation intended to deal with wider patterns of 
avoidance behavior (Part III); codifying an “economic substance” or other 
general anti-avoidance doctrine, something the United States resisted until 
2010 (Part IV); imposing anti-abuse doctrines through regulations (Part V); 
requiring disclosure of potentially abusive transactions in order to gather 
information and deter problematic deals (Part VI); and creating national 
standards to govern advice that tax professionals give, so as to keep 
professionals from blessing suspect transactions (Part VII).5 
Each method has much to commend it, at least in some circumstances, and 
each has much that is problematic. In any event, no one method will bring 
avoidance to acceptable levels by itself; there is no silver bullet. Flexibility 
works better than rigidity in attacking shelters, and a combination of methods 
works better than any single one can. Furthermore, our expectations should be 
realistic. Tax avoidance can be contained; it cannot be eliminated.6 Professor 
Tracy Kaye has written that, at this (and every other) moment,“[s]omewhere in 
America at a tax boutique firm, creative tax advisors are putting together new 
tax shelters waiting for Corporate America to earn profits that need 
sheltering,”7 and that is probably right. The target at which Congress and the 
Service are aiming is moving, and tax avoidance will always be with us. 
I.  TAX SHELTERS 
A. The Avoidance Problem 
I characterize the avoidance problem as one of “tax shelters,” but I use the 
term with no precise, technical definition. Moreover, I do not intend to limit 
the term to arrangements popularly called shelters—like pre-Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 real estate limited partnerships8 or contingent liability transactions 
used by corporations in the 1990s.9 For present purposes, I intend “tax shelter” 
 
 5. My work on these issues began with Erik M. Jensen, The US Legislative and Regulatory 
Approach to Tax Avoidance, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON REVENUE LAW: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF JOHN TILEY 99 (John Avery Jones et al. eds., 2008). 
 6. In fact, it has been suggested that “shutting down shelters actually feeds the shelter 
market because it creates a demand for the services of tax shelter providers.” David A. Weisbach, 
The Failure of Disclosure as an Approach to Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 73, 78 (2001). That is 
true, in a way, just as a strong national defense might encourage potential aggressors to increase 
military spending. But unilateral disarmament is not a defense policy, and knowing that folks will 
always seek to avoid taxes does not mean that we should give up on countering avoidance. 
 7. Tracy A. Kaye, The Regulation of Corporate Tax Shelters in the United States, 58 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 585, 604 (2010). 
 8. The utility of that sort of shelter was limited by the passive activity loss rules of I.R.C. § 
469. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part I.B.1 (describing Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, a contingent 
liability case); notes 72–79 and accompanying text (describing legislative fix for contingent 
liability shelters). 
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to refer to a transaction with claimed tax benefits that are questionable in light 
of congressional intentions and basic good sense, but that have sufficient 
authority so that fraud is not involved. 
In 2004, Professor Joseph Bankman provided a working definition that is 
useful but narrower than I would prefer: a shelter, he wrote, is “a (1) tax 
motivated; (2) transaction unrelated to a taxpayer’s normal business 
operations; that (3) under a literal reading of some relevant legal authority; (4) 
produces a loss for tax purposes in excess of any economic loss; (5) in a 
manner inconsistent with legislative intent or purpose.”10 A transaction fitting 
that definition ought to be considered a shelter, but why focus only on 
transactions intended to create losses? I would also include transactions 
structured to avoid or defer income recognition,11 to convert ordinary income 
into preferentially treated capital gain,12 or to achieve any other favorable tax 
treatment—if relevant authority is being interpreted “in a manner inconsistent 
with legislative intent or purpose,”13 and regardless of whether the transaction 
is arguably unrelated to the taxpayer’s “normal business operations.”14 
The typical shelter, broadly understood, has little or no motivation behind 
it other than hoped-for tax benefits. As Professor (and former Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury) Michael Graetz has pithily put it, a shelter is “a deal 
done by very smart people that, absent tax considerations, would be very 
stupid.”15 Moreover, although the typical shelter relies on legitimate authority, 
it is often read in a mindlessly literal way16—to achieve results that seem (and 
probably are) too good to be true when measured against congressional 
intentions.17 
 
 10. Joseph Bankman, The Tax Shelter Problem, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 925, 925 (2004). 
 11. See David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 334 (2006) (including 
“transactions that rely on a strained reading of the relevant tax provision[s] . . . to avoid including 
otherwise taxable income, and the like”). 
 12. Corporate taxpayers enjoy no preferential rate for net capital gain, see I.R.C. § 1201 
(2006) (providing that rate on net capital gain of a corporation cannot exceed what is the top rate 
anyway), but even with corporations the capital gain-ordinary income distinction matters. 
Corporations can use capital losses only to offset capital gains. See id. § 1211(a). A corporation 
with otherwise unusable capital losses therefore prefers capital gain over ordinary income. 
 13. Bankman, supra note 10, at 925. If there is doubt about whether a transaction is a shelter, 
I am happy to have “tax shelter” be the default characterization. We should be skeptical, that is, 
of any transaction that pushes the envelope. 
 14. Id.; cf. infra Part I.B.2 (discussing Cottage Savings transaction, which was related to the 
taxpayer’s trade or business). 
 15. Lynnley Browning, How to Know When a Tax Deal Isn’t a Good Deal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 10, 2008, at H6 (quoting Professor Michael Graetz). 
 16. The authority may be garbled as well. See Schizer, supra note 11, at 334 (arguing that 
shelters “exploit poorly drafted statutes and regulations”). 
 17. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, SUMMARY OF JOINT COMMITTEE STAFF “OPTIONS TO 
IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES” 2 (2005) (noting that “[r]ecent 
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Tax planning, which requires close reading of the Internal Revenue Code 
and Treasury regulations, is usually considered necessary and even desirable in 
American society,18 but mindless interpretation of authority is not.19 
(Practitioner Peter Canellos has said that shelters disparage “the intellectual 
foundations of principled and creative tax practice.”20) It is probably unfair to 
blame shelters on “textualism,” a defensible method of statutory interpretation, 
but the perception that some prominent jurists have been applying textualism 
in an extreme form may have added legitimacy to the shelter phenomenon.21 
Tax shelters based on hypertechnical interpretations are often furthered by 
taxpayers being convinced that, because of the “audit lottery” and associated 
effects, little risk is involved in claiming too-good-to-be-true results. Maybe 
there will be no audit at all; or any audit will be cursory and uninformed;22 or, 
for a large taxpayer, questionable transactions will be hidden amongst the 
details of a massive tax return.23 The risk of penalties can be a concern, of 
course, but the concern is often more theoretical than real. Penalties that are 
unlikely to be imposed are not much of a deterrent to taking aggressive return 
positions.24 
 
tax avoidance transactions have relied upon the interaction of highly technical tax law provisions 
to produce tax consequences not contemplated by Congress”); Michael L. Schler, Ten More 
Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 
55 TAX L. REV. 325, 327 (2002) (defining shelters as “transactions that violate the intent of the 
Code and the regulations”). 
 18. But see David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222 
(2002) (“[Tax planning] is almost always positively bad for society—it is worse than 
worthless.”). 
 19. “Congress sometimes intends to encourage [tax planning].” Brian Galle, Interpretative 
Theory and Tax Shelter Regulation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 357, 381 (2006) (footnote omitted). True 
enough, and reading statutes hypertechnically is sometimes justified by citing cases that have 
blessed planning. E.g., Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) (“Any one may so 
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible . . . .”), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). But 
both Judge Hand and the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Gregory rejected methods of statutory 
interpretation that ignore statutory purposes: a carefully structured corporate transaction was not 
honored because it served no corporate-level business purpose. 
 20. Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance, Form and Business 
Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47, 49 
(2001). 
 21. See Galle, supra note 19, at 359. My point is not that any particular jurists have in fact 
been using extreme forms of interpretation; it is that they are characterized as doing so. 
 22. Schizer, supra note 11, at 335 (noting shelters “take advantage of poor auditing”). 
 23. This is not always the case, however. See infra note 42 (noting that, because of the 
magnitude of the claimed losses, the shelter in Black & Decker was impossible to hide); notes 
63–64 and accompanying text (noting that the transaction at issue in Cottage Savings was 
facilitated by bank regulators). 
 24. “[T]axpayers choose avoidance and evasion strategies based on expected rather than 
nominal sanctions.” Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, 
and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 569 (2006). 
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In any event, the risk of audit and penalties matters not so much if a 
transaction is deemed legitimate. Yes, reasonable taxpayers want to avoid audit 
if possible and want to avoid litigation no matter what. But it is still better to 
have the law on your side. And, as Professor David Weisbach has emphasized, 
many shelters “work,” in the sense that, if push comes to shove, taxpayers can 
convince decision-makers that hypertechnical interpretations are justified.25 
One last point about the distinction between tax shelters and other 
transactions is worth making: taking advantage of authority in a way that is 
consistent with legislative intent is not “shelter” behavior, as I use the term, 
regardless of how good the tax results might be. For example, Congress 
understood when it enacted the Accelerated Cost Recovery System in 1981 
that, in most cases, depreciation schedules would dramatically outstrip actual 
declines in property value26—hence the adjective “accelerated.” ACRS was not 
intended to be theoretically pure; it was intended to spur investment in 
depreciable business and investment property.27 We can criticize Congress 
when it blesses behavior that we think makes no economic sense, but those 
who take advantage of congressionally endorsed incentives are not engaging in 
suspect behavior. As Professor Alan Gunn explained, “very favorable tax 
results, results that may seem too good to be true, are sometimes required by 
the language and purposes of particular statutory provisions.”28 
B. Examples of Tax Shelters 
This section discusses a couple of transactions that were tax shelters, as I 
have used the term, and that led to widely noted judicial decisions: Black & 
 
 25. See Weisbach, supra note 6, at 78. If a suspect transaction is challenged by the Internal 
Revenue Service, well-heeled taxpayers can often outgun governmental legal teams. See Schizer, 
supra note 11, at 335–36. 
 26. In fact, in better economic times, it was understood that, with some property like 
commercial buildings, value would not go down at all—indeed, it might go up—but depreciation 
deductions were still available. 
 27. I.R.C. § 179 has for many years permitted expensing the cost (“cost” here including 
acquisition indebtedness) of a limited amount of depreciable personal property by smaller 
business taxpayers. Section 179 was in part an incentive provision, but it was also intended to 
lessen bookkeeping difficulties. More recently, a provision for 100% bonus depreciation—i.e., 
permitting current deductibility of the full cost of some depreciable property, without the 
limitations of § 179—has created an extraordinary incentive for investment in property that, were 
it not for the tax break, would make no economic sense. See I.R.C. § 168(k)(5) (2006), as 
amended by Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 401, 124 Stat. 3296 (2010) (providing for 100% bonus depreciation 
on “qualified property” placed in service before 2012). Congress can permit deducting more than 
the cost of property—investment credits coupled with depreciation deductions have sometimes 
had that effect—but, when that happens, we have left “cost recovery” for another universe. 
 28. Alan Gunn, The Use and Misuse of Antiabuse Rules: Lessons from the Partnership 
Antiabuse Regulations, 54 SMU L. REV. 159, 174 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
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Decker Corp. v. United States29 and Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner.30 
(The Black & Decker transaction was understood by everyone to be a shelter; 
not everyone would characterize the Cottage Savings deal in that way.31) The 
two cases provide sets of facts that are interesting in their own right but that are 
also useful for thinking about mechanisms to counter tax avoidance. 
1. Black & Decker: Contingent Liability Shelters 
In Black & Decker, the tax results depended on the treatment of contingent 
liabilities. In 1998, Black & Decker (“B&D”) and several other entities created 
a new corporation, Black & Decker Healthcare Management Inc. 
(“BDHMI”).32 B&D transferred $561 million in cash, together with $560 
million in contingent employee and retiree healthcare benefit claims, to 
BDHMI in exchange for all the shares of one class of preferred stock.33 B&D 
later sold the preferred stock to a third-party facilitator, a trust formed by a 
former B&D employee, for $1 million.34 
Because B&D was part of a group of transferors of property in control of 
BDHMI “immediately after the exchange,” the formation of the corporation 
was tax-free under I.R.C. § 351.35 The basis rules associated with § 351 
transactions generally provide for carryover or substituted bases: a transferor 
of property will generally have a basis in stock received equal to the basis of 
the property contributed, and the corporation’s basis in contributed property 
will generally be the same as the transferor’s was.36 
Those are the “general” rules, but stock basis must be reduced by, among 
other things, liabilities transferred.37 If the healthcare claims had to be taken 
 
 29. 340 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 436 F.3d 
431 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 30. 499 U.S. 554 (1991). 
 31. See infra note 119. 
 32. Black & Decker, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 622. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See I.R.C. § 351(a) (2006) (providing for nonrecognition on exchanges of property 
solely for stock if, “immediately after the exchange,” the transferors of property are in control of 
the corporation, with “control” defined in I.R.C. § 368(c)). Because the property being transferred 
was only cash, no gain would have been recognized by B&D anyway, unless transferred 
liabilities exceeded the basis of the property transferred, see id. § 357(c)(1), and that was not the 
case. 
 36. I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1), 362(a) (2006). There are exceptions to these propositions, but, 
except for the special treatment of transferred liabilities, they were not relevant in Black & 
Decker. 
 37. See I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1) (requiring reduction in basis by amount of money distributed), 
358(d)(1) (treating relief from liabilities, other than those described in I.R.C. § 358(d)(2) (cross-
referencing I.R.C. § 357(c)(3)), as the distribution of money for purposes of computing basis in 
stock). 
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into account in determining B&D’s basis in the BDHMI stock, that basis 
would have been only $1 million (that is, $561 million less $560 million), a 
figure equal to the net value contributed. In that case, no loss would have been 
recognized on the sale of the stock for that same figure. 
B&D in effect took the position, however, that, at the time of the 
healthcare claims’ transfer to BDHMI, the obligations were too contingent to 
be treated as liabilities under the basis rules. (The idea that liabilities should be 
ignored, at least for some tax purposes, until significant contingencies have 
disappeared had authority behind it—in particular, a 1995 revenue ruling cited 
by B&D.38) As a result, B&D said its basis in the $1 million worth of BDHMI 
stock was $561 million, the amount of cash transferred, unaffected by the 
contingent obligations.39 When B&D sold the stock for $1 million, it claimed a 
$560 million loss.40 B&D had contributed net value of $1 million, had sold its 
interest for $1 million, and nevertheless had claimed a loss of $560 million—a 
loss that, if honored, could have been used to offset substantial capital gains 
that had been realized by the corporation.41 
Of course, the government challenged that position.42 There should have 
been a serious dispute about the meaning of “liability” in the relevant Code 
provisions,43 but, without discussing the Code, the trial judge in 2004 accepted 
B&D’s interpretation and granted its motion for summary judgment.44 And, 
although the judge understood that only tax considerations had motivated the 
transaction—B&D had conceded that point for purposes of the summary 
judgment motion—he concluded that there was enough indisputable economic 
substance for the transaction to be honored: BDHMI became responsible for 
the healthcare claims, had employees, and so on.45 
Had the transaction not taken place, B&D would eventually have been able 
to deduct the $560 million anyway, year by year as the claims were satisfied. 
But, under B&D’s theory, accepted by the trial judge, the effect was an 
 
 38. See Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36 (not treating contingent environmental remediation 
obligations as liabilities for purposes of I.R.C. § 357(c)(3), which is cross-referenced in I.R.C. § 
358(d)(2), for purposes of computing basis in stock). 
 39. Black & Decker, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 622. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See supra note 12 (discussing use of capital gains and losses by corporations). 
 42. This was decidedly not a shelter the success of which depended on the audit lottery. See 
supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. A claimed loss of that magnitude was not going to 
escape scrutiny. 
 43. See I.R.C. § 357 (2006) (especially §§ 357(c)(3), 358(d)). 
 44. Black & Decker, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 623–24. 
 45. Id. at 624. 
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immediate deduction of the full $560 million—a dramatic acceleration of the 
tax benefit.46 
B&D was right that, at least for some tax purposes, a contingent obligation 
would not be treated as a “liability” until the contingencies had disappeared. 
But in this case the technical argument—a hypertechnical argument—trumped 
good sense. Although any particular claim might have been technically 
contingent—further work was necessary to evaluate each employee’s claim, 
and some would be found meritless—in the aggregate the obligations were real 
enough to affect the value of the stock B&D sold. That is why the purchaser of 
B&D’s stock in BDHMI was willing to pay only $1 million. 
Whether the grant of summary judgment was consistent with “legislative 
intent or purpose” depends on what that phrase means, of course. The average 
Congressman—indeed, the above-average Congressman—is clueless about 
corporate taxation; in that respect, there was no legislative intent to search for. 
Nevertheless, I am confident that, if Congress had been able to focus on such a 
transaction, and had in fact done so—a lot of counterfactuals here—it would 
not have intended the result reached by the judge. As a matter of first 
principles, the result was too good to be true.47 
The system did adjust. As will be discussed presently, Congress in 2000 
enacted remedial legislation that, although it did not apply to Black & Decker, 
cut the heart out of contingent liability transactions.48 It took a while, but good 
sense entered the judicial system as well. On appeal in 2006, the Fourth Circuit 
accepted a variant of B&D’s basis analysis—that the healthcare claims were 
not liabilities for purposes of the basis calculations because of express 
language in § 357(c)(3)49—a defensible, albeit hypertechnical, result.50 But the 
 
 46. The loss on the sale of the stock was capital rather than the ordinary deduction that 
would have been taken had the claims been satisfied, but B&D had sufficient capital gains to use 
the capital loss currently. See supra note 12 (discussing use of capital gains and losses by 
corporations). 
  The timing issue was critical in Black & Decker, but something else might have been at 
stake as well. BDHMI apparently took deductions as the claims were satisfied. If B&D had 
prevailed, the result would effectively have been double deductions, immediately to B&D and 
later to BDHMI. 
 47. And it was not as though Congress had explicitly blessed the too-good-to-be-true results. 
See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. If the shelter worked, it was because B&D was 
openly and notoriously exploiting a quirk in the statute. 
 48. See infra notes 72–79 and accompanying text. 
 49. B&D would have been entitled to deduct the obligations if it had paid them. Under 
I.R.C. § 357(c)(3), such an obligation is not a liability for purposes of I.R.C. § 357(c) and, by 
cross-reference, the stock basis rule of I.R.C. § 358(d)(1). See I.R.C. §§ 357(c)(3), 358(d)(2) 
(2006) (cross-referencing I.R.C. § 357(c)(3)). I.R.C. § 357(c)(3) was clearly intended to take 
cash-basis payables out of the definition of “liabilities” for these purposes. When that section was 
enacted, no member of Congress was thinking of obligations like those in Black & Decker. 
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Fourth Circuit also remanded the case for consideration of whether B&D’s 
desired result, even if apparently consistent with statutory language, should 
have been disallowed because the transaction was a sham.51 Satisfying 
statutory requirements that are interpreted in a hypertechnical way should not 
necessarily be enough for a transaction to be honored. Before the trial on 
remand began, B&D, recognizing that it was probably fighting a losing battle, 
accepted a settlement offer from the government.52 
In a perfect world—with statutory, regulatory, and judicial doctrines lined 
up to prevent bizarre results—B&D’s argument would have been a loser to 
begin with, with little to discuss. But it was not a clear loser at the time—if it 
had been, B&D would not have participated in the contingent liability 
shelter53—and that is why there is a lot to discuss. 
2. Cottage Savings: Exchanges of Bundles of Mortgages 
The contingent liability transaction in Black & Decker was a tax shelter 
under anyone’s definition of that term. If the system could not adjust to deal 
with transactions of that sort, the system was beyond repair.54 A harder case 
that serves as a good test for anti-avoidance doctrines is Cottage Savings Ass’n 
v. Commissioner,55 decided by the Supreme Court in 1991. Because real 
economic losses were involved, and because the transactions at issue were 
related to the taxpayer’s trade or business, the Cottage Savings deals are 
generally not thought of as tax shelters; they would not have fit Professor 
Bankman’s definition.56 But, as Professor Weisbach has noted, in Cottage 
Savings “[a]bsolutely nothing happened except for tax.”57 In that respect, this 
was a shelter par excellence. 
The taxpayer, a savings and loan association, was holding low-interest 
home mortgages in a market (the late 1970s) with dramatically rising interest 
 
 50. Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 437–38 (4th Cir. 2006). This 
argument, that the obligations were not liabilities because B&D would have been able to take the 
deductions if it had paid the claims itself, is probably the one that B&D should have been 
hammering to begin with, rather than focusing on contingencies. 
 51. See id. at 443. The sham transaction doctrine was a judicial creation. See Knetsch v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 361, 364–65 (1960). 
 52. Sheryl Stratton, Black & Decker to Settle; Bigger Case on Horizon, TAX NOTES TODAY, 
Mar. 5, 2007, available at LEXIS, 2007 TNT 43-1. 
 53. B&D had its corporate eyes open when it entered into this transaction, which was 
conceded (at least for summary judgment purposes) to have been motivated only by tax 
considerations. 
 54. It did adjust. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text (discussing remand of Black 
& Decker for consideration of sham transaction doctrine and subsequent settlement); see also 
infra notes 72–79 and accompanying text (discussing statutory fix). 
 55. 499 U.S. 554 (1991). 
 56. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
 57. Weisbach, supra note 6, at 75. 
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rates.58 As rates rose, the value of the mortgages inevitably declined. In the 
American income tax system, however, decline in value generally does not 
create a deductible loss—even if the decline can be irrefutably demonstrated 
and even if the loss is unquestionably attributable to business or investment. 
For the most part, the system does not work on a mark-to-market basis.59 
Something else—a “realization” event, like a sale—must occur.60 
In an attempt to create tax losses, Cottage Savings in 1980 in effect 
exchanged bundles of ninety percent participation interests in those mortgages 
for other, almost identical bundles put together by other financial institutions.61 
(In form Cottage Savings sold participation interests to several S&Ls and then 
purchased other, fungible interests from those S&Ls, but the transactions were 
effectively exchanges of value for value.) The new bundles were secured by 
different homes and the obligors were different, but the bundles relinquished 
and the bundles received were economically fungible.62 
The transactions would have been disastrous if losses had had to be 
recognized for financial accounting purposes; regulators might have had to 
shut Cottage Savings (and other S&Ls) down. No one, including bank 
regulators, wanted that to happen, however, and transactions of this sort would 
not have occurred had the regulators, with their eyes wide open, not given the 
go-ahead: the regulators made the exchanges nonevents for financial 
accounting purposes.63 The goal was to permit S&Ls like Cottage Savings to 
recognize losses for tax purposes,64 without having to do so otherwise. 
 
 58. Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 556. 
 59. Congress has enacted some income provisions, however, that do not require realization. 
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1256 (2006) (providing for marking to market of “section 1256 contract[s],” 
like “regulated futures contract[s]” and “foreign currency contract[s]”). 
 60. “Realization” is also generally necessary on the income side. See Eisner v. Macomber, 
252 U.S. 189, 195 (1920) (holding that realization is a constitutional requirement to have 
“income” within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment). Many think realization is no longer 
constitutionally required, but it is still often understood as part of the definition of “gross income” 
under I.R.C. § 61. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (holding that 
“accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion” 
are gross income unless Congress provides otherwise). But see supra note 59 (noting that some 
Code provisions do not require realization). In any event, the Court in Glenshaw Glass did not 
explicitly say that realization is a requirement under I.R.C. § 61. It said only that if there has been 
an accession to wealth, clearly realized, etc., the result is gross income. 
 61. Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 557. 
 62. Id. at 557–58. Furthermore, since Cottage Savings would have continued to service the 
loans, borrowers would not have known that anything had happened. They would have continued 
to write checks to Cottage Savings. 
 63. Id. at 557. 
 64. Id. The exchanges were of bundles of equal value, as one would expect legitimate 
exchanges to be. The losses came from receiving value less than the bases of the bundles 
exchanged. 
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It has long been recognized that financial accounting and tax accounting 
can (and often do) diverge; the rules are different because the two regimes 
serve different purposes.65 Inconsistency in accounting treatment was thus not 
by itself an indication of any abuse in Cottage Savings. 
But if the appropriate baseline was that tax losses should not be recognized 
until a realization event has occurred, these exchanges provided a weak 
foundation for a deduction. Exchanges are generally realization events,66 but in 
Cottage Savings, the Commissioner reasonably argued that, for tax purposes, 
nothing had happened.67 When the dust had settled, Cottage Savings’ 
economic position was unchanged. A relevant Treasury Regulation said that, 
unless otherwise provided, “gain or loss realized from . . . the exchange of 
property for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent is 
treated as income or as loss sustained,”68 and, the government argued, there 
were no material differences between the relinquished and replacement 
bundles of mortgages. 
The Supreme Court held, however, that the bundles were “materially 
different” because they embodied “legally distinct entitlements,” with different 
obligors and different homes involved.69 It is often said that the government in 
Cottage Savings was trapped by its own regulation, and there is something to 
that: as structured, the regulation implies that an exchange is presumptively 
taxable.70 But “differing materially” is not self-defining, and the term did not 
have to be interpreted in a hypertechnical way. As interpreted, however, the 
test was a hair trigger: almost any difference between relinquished and 
 
 65. See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 522, 545–46 (1979) (holding that, even if 
a write-down of inventory was permissible, and maybe required, for financial accounting 
purposes—so as to send the right signal to investors about the taxpayer’s financial health—the 
write-down was not a realization event, and it therefore created no deductible loss for tax 
purposes). The two sets of rules have to diverge. For example, when Congress enacts depreciation 
rules that do not correspond to economic reality, as it often does, see supra notes 26–28 and 
accompanying text, it would be absurd, and maybe dangerous, to expect financial accounting to 
follow those rules. 
 66. See Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940) (including “exchange of property” in 
a list of realization events). 
 67. Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 559–60. 
 68. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (2007). 
 69. Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 566–67. 
 70. In other situations where a technical realization event seems to lack substance—sale of 
loss property from one family member to another, for example, so that the family unit retains 
control—Congress has specifically provided for nonrecognition. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267(a)(1), (c) 
(2006) (denying loss recognition on sales or loss properties from one related person to another). 
Implicit in I.R.C. § 267(a)(1) is the idea that the transaction would otherwise be a taxable event. 
See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (2006) (providing for nonrecognition of gain or loss on exchanges of like-
kind property); Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 566 (inferring from I.R.C. § 1031 that exchanges of 
very similar property are taxable unless Congress provides otherwise). 
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replacement properties was enough for realization. For Cottage Savings, there 
had been no change in economic position, but there were deductible losses for 
tax purposes—a result, in the minds of some, too good to be true.71 
3. Responding to Shelters 
Any methods proposed to deal with tax avoidance should take cases like 
Black & Decker and Cottage Savings into account. Some absurd results are 
inevitable in a complex tax system, of course, but how do we prevent results 
that, while tenuously supported by a serious legal argument, are nonetheless 
bizarre? And how do we do so without causing serious damage to legitimate 
economic activity? 
Those are questions Congress and the Internal Revenue Service must 
constantly wrestle with. And those questions are addressed in the rest of this 
Article, which surveys and evaluates several statutory and regulatory methods 
to counter tax avoidance. 
II.  TARGETED LEGISLATION (OR REGULATIONS) 
If statutes or regulations are being read hypertechnically to facilitate tax 
avoidance, one possible remedy is to amend the authority to clarify that 
offending interpretations are impermissible, at least in the context of particular 
transactions. 
A. Examples of Targeted Legislation 
Congress did just that to deal with contingent liability transactions like the 
one in Black & Decker, which had become widespread. In 2000, after the 
Black & Decker transaction had occurred, but before the litigation developed, 
Congress modified the stock basis rule that applies for § 351 (and other) 
transactions to provide as follows: if the result under the otherwise applicable 
rules would be a basis greater than fair market value, that basis must be 
reduced (but not below value) by the amount of liabilities not taken into 
account under § 358(d)(1).72 For this purpose, with a couple of exceptions, “the 
term ‘liability’ shall include any fixed or contingent obligation to make 
payment, without regard to whether the obligation is otherwise taken into 
account for purposes of this title.”73 That definition, in § 358(h)(3), explicitly 
picked up contingent obligations like those in Black & Decker.74 As a result, 
 
 71. A “hair trigger” standard is not so good, however, for taxpayers who are trying to avoid 
gain recognition on the exchange of appreciated assets for fungible assets. See infra notes 88–89 
and accompanying text. 
 72. I.R.C. § 358(h)(1) (2006). 
 73. Id. § 358(h)(3). 
 74. For that matter, it picks up any obligations, whether contingent or not, that are not taken 
into account under I.R.C. § 357(c)(3) and I.R.C. § 358(d)(2). That would include the classic 
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whether or not transferred liabilities are contingent, they are generally required 
to reduce the stock basis—either under the general rule or under the 2000 
extension of that rule.75 
The statutory change did not apply in Black & Decker because of the 
effective date,76 but, had it applied, B&D’s basis in the BDHMI stock would 
have been $1 million. Start with the $561 million in cash. The claims might 
have been contingent, and therefore would not have been taken into account 
under § 358(d).77 But that would have left the basis in the stock above fair 
market value, so the special rule of § 358(h) would have come into play,78 
reducing the basis to $1 million.79 Problem solved—at least until smart people 
find ways around the amended statute. 
Another example of targeted legislation is the partnership disguised sale 
provision in § 707(a)(2)(B), enacted in 1984.80 Taxpayers had occasionally 
used contributions to and distributions from partnerships to disguise sales of 
property.81 Suppose a taxpayer is holding a parcel of real estate that is worth 
$20,000 but which he acquired for only $5,000. If he sells the property for 
$20,000, he would pay tax on $15,000 of gain. But suppose he instead 
contributes the parcel to a partnership and later receives a distribution of 
$20,000 in cash. Contributions to and distributions from partnerships are 
generally nontaxable events. If each step is analyzed alone, the taxpayer would 
 
situation at which I.R.C. § 357(c)(3) was directed: cash-basis payables that would have been 
deductible if payment had been made by the transferor. 
 75. The difference between the general rule and the special rule is that reductions in basis 
under I.R.C. § 358(d)(1) can result in a stock basis less than fair market value. Any reduction 
mandated by I.R.C. § 358(h)(1), however, will not go below fair market value. 
 76. In addition, the Service had provided in Notice 2001-17, 2001-1 C.B. 730, that it would 
challenge contingent liability transactions. IRS Notice 2001-17, 2001-1 C.B. 730. That notice was 
also not in place when B&D entered into its transaction. 
 77. If they had been deemed to be liabilities under general principles, the basis would have 
been reduced under I.R.C. § 358(d)(1) anyway, and we would not have needed to apply the new 
rule. 
 78. The exceptions in I.R.C. § 358(h)(2) would not have applied; no business assets were 
transferred, just cash. 
 79. See Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(7), 114 
Stat. 2763 (2000). The existence of the new statute and the notice, both of which were on the 
books when the case was litigated, could have been understood to strengthen B&D’s argument 
that its transaction worked under the authority in place when the deal was consummated. 
Otherwise, why amend the statute? See infra text accompanying note 97. 
 80. I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
 81. See, e.g., Barenholtz v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 85, 90–91 (1981) (finding disguised sale, on 
the facts, before enactment of I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B)). But see Otey v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 312, 321–
22 (1978) (coming to opposite conclusion on the facts). 
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receive the economic benefit, but not the tax liability, from the “disguised” 
sale—assuming sufficient basis in the partnership interest.82 
Disguising a sale using a partnership was never the norm,83 but the 
potential for abuse was there. In the 1984 legislation, Congress set out 
circumstances in which a contribution and distribution would be 
recharacterized as a sale of all or part of the contributed property. Taxpayers 
(and judges too) were put on notice that step-transaction and substance-over-
form principles had to be applied to determine if the two transfers, “when 
viewed together, [were] properly characterized as a sale or exchange of 
property.”84 In some respects the enactment merely codified existing 
understanding,85 but that understanding was embellished by subsequent 
regulations, providing rules as to when a contribution and a distribution were 
to be “viewed together.”86 
B. The Limitations of Targeted Statutes and Regulations 
Legislation and regulations that target particular transactions can have an 
effect—because of the 2000 amendments, a Black & Decker-like transaction is 
a nonstarter today87—but in some cases they will not work, even in the short 
run. Modification of the regulation involved in Cottage Savings might have 
changed the result in later, similar cases, but with the risk to the government 
that transactions involving exchanges of appreciated fungible assets could fall 
on the tax-free side of the line. Cottage Savings was in form a loss for the 
government, but a hair-trigger standard of realization has revenue-raising 
potential on the gain side.88 From the government’s standpoint, a technical 
 
 82. A distribution of cash is taxable to the extent it exceeds a partner’s basis in his 
partnership interest. See I.R.C. § 731(a)(1) (2006). For my example to be potentially tax-free, 
assume the partner has a basis of at least $20,000 before the distribution. 
 83. The formal results were not all positive, and the competing interests of the contributing 
and noncontributing partners generally prevented abusive transactions. If the transaction is not a 
sale, the partnership would take the property with a basis of only $5,000, not $20,000. See id. § 
723. 
 84. Id. § 707(a)(2)(B). 
 85. But even if the codified set of rules was not fundamentally new, adding the 
congressional seal of approval gave added weight to those principles. 
 86. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.707-3–1.707-6. Two recent cases have found disguised sales by 
applying I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B). See Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 199 (2010); Va. Historic 
Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP v. Comm’r, 639 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 2011), rev’g T.C. Memo. 2009-295. 
 87. Codification of the economic substance doctrine would also make contingent liability 
shelters unworkable today. See infra Part IV. 
 88. How, for example, should exchanges of barrels of oil by petroleum companies be 
treated? Such exchanges take place all the time, for good business reasons, and the 
nonrecognition rule of I.R.C. § 1031 (2006), dealing with like-kind exchanges, does not apply to 
exchanges of inventory. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(A). Does a barrel of appreciated North Slope oil 
differ materially from a barrel of appreciated North Sea oil? 
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change to fix the Cottage Savings “problem” might have been worse from a 
revenue standpoint than doing nothing, unless the regulatory draftsmen were 
willing to contemplate different realization rules for gains and losses.89 
Even when they do work, statutes or regulations directed at particular 
transactions can go only so far. At best, they react to specific events and apply 
to specific sorts of transactions. By the time Congress or the Internal Revenue 
Service realizes a barn door is open, the horse is often across the state line.90 
Whether the horse is gone or not, a quick statutory response is unlikely in 
the U.S., with its system of separation of powers.91 And targeted statutes (and, 
to a lesser extent, regulations) typically have only prospective effect, doing 
nothing about transactions already under contract or already consummated.92 
(In that case, even if the escaped horse has remained in the neighborhood,93 it 
is lost to the tax system.) The Constitution does not seriously limit enactments 
with retroactive, negative effect—at least if the retroactivity is modest94—but 
Congress is generally reluctant to make statutes retroactively negative.95 
 
 89. One can imagine having a hair-trigger test on the gain side and a more stringent rule on 
the loss side. But supporters of symmetry might object, and one might reasonably wonder 
whether the Service would have authority to adopt an asymmetrical rule of that sort without an 
explicit congressional directive. 
 90. One argument in favor of a disclosure regime is to help the government secure the barn 
to prevent the door from opening in the first place. See infra Part VI. 
 91. Even if one political party controls the presidency and both houses of Congress, party 
discipline is weak and concerted action is unlikely. Parliamentary systems are better able to take 
quick action to curb abuses with targeted legislation, which is one reason the British tax system is 
more formalistic than the American. 
 92. Regulatory agencies can act faster than Congress, but here too remedies are usually 
prospective. For example, on May 31, 2007, the Service announced it would issue regulations, 
effective that day, dealing with stock repurchases made by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
corporations in triangular mergers—treating funds used as subject to U.S. taxation because of 
deemed repatriation to the U.S. IRS Notice 2007-48, 2007-1 C.B. 1428. The Notice responded to 
an IBM announcement, two days earlier, that it had effected a $12.5 billion repurchase. IBM 
saved $1.6 billion that would have been due had the deal proceeded under the new rules. See 
William M. Bulkeley, IBM’s Under-the-Wire Tax Break, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2007, at A3. 
 93. Neighborhood, get it? 
 94. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 27 (1994) (finding no constitutional problem 
in retroactivity that went slightly beyond the beginning of the year of enactment); ERIK M. 
JENSEN, THE TAXING POWER: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
184–85 (2005) (discussing retroactivity and the Constitution). 
 95. Regulations sometimes do have retroactive effect, although retroactivity is constrained 
by I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1), generally providing that proposed, temporary, and final regulations shall 
not apply “to any taxable period ending before the earliest of” three dates: the date of filing with 
the Federal Register; for a final regulation, the date on which proposed or temporary regulations 
relating to the final regulation were so posted; or the date of any notice that substantially 
described what was to be in the regulations. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1) (2006). I.R.C. § 7805(b) also 
provides several exceptions to that general rule, permitting retroactivity, for example, for 
“promptly issued regulations” (i.e., regulations issued within eighteen months of the date of 
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(Statutes with retroactive positive effects are another matter.96) Furthermore, 
new authority with a prospective effective date may invite the argument that 
Congress or the Service implicitly blessed transactions consummated before 
that date.97 
Targeted provisions clog up the Code and regulations. If new language is 
drafted to deal with the specifics of each potentially abusive transaction, the 
already out-of-control body of authority gets even worse. As the late Professor 
(and one-time Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) Stanley Surrey wrote in 
1969, “It is clear that [anti-avoidance provisions and doctrines] save the tax 
system from the far greater proliferation of detail that would be necessary if the 
tax avoider could succeed merely by bringing his scheme within the literal 
language of substantive provisions written to govern the everyday world.”98 
And, even if effective—maybe especially if effective—detailed provisions 
can have a short useful life, while they continue as part of the Internal Revenue 
Code. Think of the poor, young tax associate trying to figure out the meaning 
of complex Code provisions that were directed at avoidance transactions of the 
distant past—transactions the associate is unlikely to see in practice.99 The 
effectiveness of a statute—drying up transactions at which it was directed—
can make its meaning obscure to later generations.100 
Finally, new statutory or regulatory language is, well, new language, 
something that energizes tax professionals. Give us new words to interpret, and 
we will interpret them as favorably to our clients as possible. As the late, great 
Marty Ginsburg predicted, in his “Law of Moses’ Rod,” “[E]very stick crafted 
 
enactment of the related statute; where retroactivity is necessary to prevent abuse; to correct 
procedural defects in a previously issued regulation; and when Congress has specifically 
authorized the issuance of regulations with retroactive effect). See I.R.C. § 7805(b)(2), (3), (4), 
(6). 
 96. That sort of thing is politically popular, and no one has standing to complain, at least not 
in court. 
 97. See supra note 79. If Congress has blessed too-good-to-be-true results, the Service is not 
going to prevail by raising anti-avoidance doctrines. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying 
text. 
 98. Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the 
Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 707 n.31 (1969). 
 99. Perhaps it is unfair to say that a statutory provision which deters particular transactions 
has a short effective life. If, because of a statute, no one even contemplates doing such a 
transaction, the statute has obvious effect. My point is that once such transactions are not even 
being considered in the real world, young lawyers have no reason to try to understand what the 
statute was intended to do. But the provision stays on the books, creating confusion for future 
generations. 
 100. The statutory fix for contingent liability shelters is one that might bewilder young 
lawyers in the future, requiring, as it does, bouncing back and forth between a couple of Code 
provisions. See supra notes 72–79 and accompanying text. And it is not obvious to the casual 
observer, either from the face of the amendment or its placement—tacked on in I.R.C. § 358(h), 
rather than being added to I.R.C. § 358(d)—what the reason for enactment was. 
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to beat on the head of a taxpayer will, sooner or later, metamorphose into a 
large green snake and bite the Commissioner [of Internal Revenue] on the hind 
part.”101 No matter how well intentioned, changing statutory and regulatory 
language can breed, rather than deter, tax avoidance. 
III.  OUTCOMES-ORIENTED LEGISLATION 
In some situations, a congressional response more promising than targeted 
legislation of the sort described in Part II is to go after broad categories of 
behavior based on outcomes rather than the technical calculations of, or the 
motivations behind, transactions. This strategy is illustrated by the oxymoronic 
passive activity loss (“PAL”) rules of § 469, enacted in 1986 and directed at 
the then prevalent shelters marketed to individual investors.102 
The typical investment structure for the shelters targeted by the passive 
activity loss rules was a limited partnership engaged in a business intended to 
generate losses (through accelerated depreciation and the like) that purely 
passive investors (lawyers, doctors, and other high-income folk) could use to 
offset income from other sources. The fact that the same structure (high-
income persons investing as limited partners in limited partnerships) was used 
for many different types of shelters (real estate, movie production, research and 
development, and others) gave congressional drafters something to aim at. In 
that respect, the PAL rules are another example of targeted legislation, 
although the nature of the target is different from what I described earlier—a 
particular sort of arrangement with particular, potential outcomes, rather than a 
particular transaction.103 
In form complex—§ 469 of the Code goes on and on—the PAL rules 
actually operate in a simple way. Losses from a trade or business in which a 
taxpayer does not materially participate (a “passive activity”)—a category that 
generally includes a limited partnership interest in a limited partnership that 
conducts a trade or business—can be used only to offset income from other 
passive activities.104 The losses cannot be used against income from practicing 
medicine or law, say. Nor can they be used to offset what came to be called 
portfolio income—interest, dividends, royalties, and the like—the sort of thing 
that most of us would have thought of as passive income if Congress had not 
 
 101. Martin D. Ginsburg, The National Office Mission, 27 TAX NOTES 99, 100 (1985). 
 102. In this Part, I discuss only legislation, and not regulations. In theory, one can imagine 
regulations with broad effect of the sort I am discussing, but there could be serious questions 
about Treasury’s authority to issue such regulations without express congressional authorization. 
Cf. infra Part V (discussing partnership anti-abuse regulation, which was issued without specific 
statutory authority and which seemed to go beyond the statute to which it is tied). 
 103. The difference between outcomes-oriented legislation and the targeted legislation 
considered in Part II may therefore be one of degree rather than kind. 
 104. I.R.C. § 469(a)(1), (d)(1), (h)(2) (2006). 
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defined the term differently in § 469.105 By restricting their utility, § 469 made 
losses from passive activities less valuable than had been true before 1986 and 
therefore made loss-generating passive investments less attractive. The PAL 
rules largely took away the benefit of those shelters for individuals, and, as a 
result, the shelters largely disappeared. 
The PAL rules worked in an imaginative and administrable way. Professor 
George Yin has praised how the rules did not require many difficult judgment 
calls. Section 469 is not concerned with whether the taxpayer’s activities are 
undertaken for valid business purposes or tax avoidance purposes, or with any 
other particular motive or intent. It is not concerned with how the amount of 
tax savings resulting from a transaction compares to its pre-tax economic 
return. Section 469 “operates to prohibit or constrain certain outcomes, 
however they may be achieved and for whatever reason.”106 The PAL rules 
earned a high grade for predictability, as well as scope, of application.107 
Section 469 is not above criticism, however. Despite its complexity, the 
provision simplified the world by eliminating shelters of a particular sort. 
However, it can affect other transactions as well, including ones that do not 
seem abusive in any way, and its complexity is therefore not of purely 
historical interest. 
For example, suppose a passive investor is contemplating putting real 
dollars—cool, hard cash—into a business that will, in its early stages, generate 
losses—as new enterprises generally do. It is hard to see anything 
automatically wrong in permitting the deductibility of out-of-pocket outlays 
connected to business activity,108 as long as no capitalization issues are 
involved,109 but § 469 would come into play in this situation. The investor 
 
 105. See id. § 469(e)(1). That income may be attributable to someone’s trade or business, but 
an investor (e.g., a shareholder in a corporation) is not treated as being engaged in a trade or 
business by reason of his investment. This most passive of all income was intentionally not 
treated as income from a passive activity. 
 106. George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from 
History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209, 219 (2001). 
 107. The predictability point might be made about the Black & Decker fix as well, see supra 
notes 72–79 and accompanying text, but the scope of that fix is much narrower than the PAL 
rules. 
 108. Assume, that is, that there is no attempt to generate deductions heightened by the Crane 
basis rule, where a small cash outlay coupled with nonrecourse indebtedness could potentially 
generate deductions with economic value far in excess of the actual outlay. See Crane v. Comm’r, 
331 U.S. 1 (1947). In this hypothetical, nothing in the at-risk rules of I.R.C. § 465 (Congress’s 
first big attack, in 1976, on the effects of the Crane basis rule) would limit deductions because the 
taxpayer would be considered at risk for the full amount of cash contributed. 
 109. If outlays are capital expenditures, related to a hoped-for future income stream, they 
should not be currently deductible. And with a new business the expenditures could be start-up 
expenditures, a form of capital expenditure for which some limited relief is provided in I.R.C. § 
195. But the capitalization issues are independent of I.R.C. § 469. 
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would be able to currently deduct losses from his investment only to the extent 
he has income from other passive activities, and he therefore may be unwilling 
to make the investment in the first place. But why should the utility of those 
deductions be limited? This is not the sort of transaction at which the PAL 
rules were aimed or should be aimed. 
Of course any effective anti-avoidance doctrine, codified or not, will reach, 
and therefore deter, some behavior that ought not to be disfavored; some 
glitches are inevitable.110 But § 469 might go too far in that direction. It is one 
thing to deter questionable transactions, even if they are perhaps defensible. It 
is quite another to deter transactions that have no conceivable avoidance 
problems, and that, moreover, might even be socially useful.111 (Targeted fixes 
of the sort discussed in Part II are less likely to be overbroad in this way.112) 
In addition, because shelter planners work around the law as it exists, § 
469, which is in form a set of black-letter rules, does not reach new generations 
of shelters.113 (The same criticism can obviously be leveled at the targeted 
provisions discussed earlier.) Since 1986, the tax shelter problem in the U.S. 
has shifted to different sorts of transactions (like basis or income shifting using 
tax-indifferent parties114) often entered into by different sorts of legal persons, 
including corporations. The PAL rules do not speak to these new forms of 
shelters and generally do not apply to the investors in them.115 
It might be that another form of outcomes-oriented legislation could help 
with new shelters, and some possibilities have been suggested. For example, 
Professors Marvin Chirelstein and Lawrence Zelenak have proposed rules 
emphasizing outcomes, actual or foreseeable, rather than economic substance 
or taxpayer motive: “(1) No deduction shall be allowed for losses substantially 
in excess of any measurable reduction in the taxpayer’s net worth, and (2) no 
deduction or exclusion from gross income shall be allowed through the 
 
 110. Cf. Weisbach, supra note 6, at 82 (“[I]f strong anti-shelter doctrines do catch a few 
transactions that we might otherwise allow, it is hard to see the harm.”). 
 111. As will be discussed in subsequent parts of this Article, more general anti-avoidance 
doctrines can operate to cut off transactions that are not picked up by specific statutory fixes. That 
is, even if you dot all the i’s and cross all the t’s that seem to be required by the statute, you might 
not get your desired results. Perhaps there ought to be the equivalent understanding working the 
other way: even though your transaction fits clearly within the PAL rules, you ought to be 
immune if the underlying purpose of those rules is not implicated. 
 112. Cf. supra text accompanying note 98 (quoting Professor Surrey to the effect that anti-
avoidance doctrines save the tax system from the proliferation of targeted regulations that would 
be necessary to prevent each potentially abusive transaction). 
 113. By “black-letter rules,” I do not mean rules without ambiguities. Except for statutes 
directed at the most ordinary behavior, ambiguities are inevitable. 
 114. A “tax-indifferent party” is—duh—one indifferent to the effect of taxes, such as a tax-
exempt entity. 
 115. See I.R.C. § 469(a)(2) (2006) (limiting application of PAL rules to enumerated persons, 
not including widely held corporations). 
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allocation of noneconomic income to a tax-indifferent party . . . .”116 These 
proposed rules are intended to be bright-line tests, not standards or principles 
to guide decision-makers. 
And Professor Alan Gunn has found in the partnership anti-abuse 
regulation, which I will discuss later,117 a meritorious standard that also would 
look to outcomes. It would deny “a tax result that no sensible legislator would 
have approved of if the transaction had been called to the legislator’s attention 
when the statute was drafted”118—regardless of motive, economic substance, 
or anything else. It would be difficult to enact a statute in that form—would 
Congress acknowledge it cannot think of everything and that “sensible 
legislator” is not redundant?—but perhaps Congress could explicitly say that 
results inconsistent with legislative intent are not to be honored. Surely 
Congress has the power, at least to some extent, to provide for how its 
enactments should be interpreted. 
Conceptually, those positions have much to commend them. If either 
Chirelstein-Zelenak or Gunn were enacted, courts reluctant or unwilling to 
apply anti-avoidance doctrines would have no choice but to apply the 
outcomes test. Furthermore, either standard, properly applied, would lead to 
the right result in a case like Black & Decker: no loss on sale of the BDHMI 
stock. 
No test is perfect by itself, however, and Chirelstein and Zelenak recognize 
that their proposal would not change the result in a case like Cottage Savings, 
where real economic losses were involved.119 And, although I assume Gunn’s 
“sensible legislator” would condemn Cottage Savings, I could be wrong, given 
Congress’s traditional sympathy for the S&L industry. 
It is also the case that the positives Professor Yin saw in the PAL rules are 
absent from these proposals. Neither would call traditional tax planning into 
question, but uncertainty in application would be great.120 Measures of “net 
worth” or “noneconomic income” cannot be scientifically precise. (I am not 
sure that science can be scientifically precise.) And trying to discern what a 
sensible legislator would have thought had she been thinking about a matter 
has its own conceptual difficulties. Maybe they can be overcome, at least to 
some extent. Some cases are easy—when the results are too good to be true, 
and there is no reason to think Congress intended to be so generous. 
 
 116. Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver 
Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1952–53 (2005) (footnotes omitted). 
 117. See infra Part V. 
 118. Gunn, supra note 28, at 160. 
 119. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 116, at 1960–61. Chirelstein and Zelenak question, 
however, whether the Cottage Savings transaction should be considered a shelter in the first 
place. Id. 
 120. See Yin, supra note 106, at 220–21. 
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Furthermore, when good results, although questionable, are intellectually 
defensible—so that a “sensible legislator” might not be outraged by them—
perhaps anti-abuse rules should not apply at all. In any event, we need to 
recognize that these suggestions would not be self-executing in codified form. 
Besides, the Chirelstein-Zelenak proposal comes from fuzzy-headed 
academics, which means it has no prospect of enactment. And Gunn’s 
interpretation, another academic product, will also not reach the halls of 
Congress. These suggestions seem to make more sense as interpretive 
standards than as codified rules. And that brings me to a new set of issues: 
whether codification of general anti-avoidance doctrines is a good idea in the 
United States. 
IV.  CODIFYING ANTI-AVOIDANCE DOCTRINES: THE NEW ECONOMIC 
SUBSTANCE PROVISION 
Drafting carefully tailored, substantive provisions that will put a dent into 
tax-shelter activity has always been difficult, which is one reason general anti-
avoidance doctrines developed judicially and why they have attracted new 
interest as statutory fixes. Many other industrialized nations have enacted 
general anti-avoidance rules (“GAAR”s),121 but, until recently, the United 
States had resisted. Although some anti-avoidance provisions had been enacted 
to deal with particular situations, like deductions associated with corporate 
acquisitions,122 fifteen years ago Professor Charles Gustafson could accurately 
write that “Congress ha[d] never seriously considered and no administration 
ha[d] proposed the adoption of a general anti-avoidance or anti-abuse rule that 
would apply to all situations.”123 
It is still true that no codified rule applies to “all situations,” but, with the 
urging of the Obama administration, Congress codified one version of the 
economic substance (or business purpose) doctrine. The Democratic Congress 
started making serious noises about doing this during the second Bush 
administration,124 but that administration balked. In 2010, however, with 
Democrats controlling both the White House and Congress, codification of the 
 
 121. See Zoe Prebble & John Prebble, Comparing the General Anti-Avoidance Rule of 
Income Tax Law with the Civil Law Doctrine of Abuse of Law, BULL. INT’L TAX’N, Apr. 2008, at 
151 (discussing some of the GAARs in effect—for example, in Germany and New Zealand). 
 122. See I.R.C. § 269 (2006) (denying deductions and credits for corporate acquisitions if the 
“principal purpose . . . is evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax”). 
 123. Charles H. Gustafson, The Politics and Practicalities of Checking Tax Avoidance in the 
United States, in TAX AVOIDANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 349, 350 (Graeme S. Cooper ed., 
1997). 
 124. See Senate Finance Tax Counsel Says Codification of Economic Substance Likely, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, May 17, 2007, available at LEXIS, 2007 TNT 97-3. Tax Analysts later removed 
the cited item from its database, noting that “[t]he information at this cite was not intended for 
publication.” I assume that means the tax counsel’s comments were intended to be off the record. 
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doctrine (or, more accurately, a doctrine) was included in the ObamaCare 
legislation.125 
A. The Merits and Demerits of Codifying an Anti-Avoidance Doctrine 
There was principle behind codification of economic substance, to be sure, 
but dollars-and-cents concerns were involved as well. Codification was scored 
as a revenue-raiser, albeit a small one, and supporters of health care legislation 
were looking for revenue wherever it might be found.126 But what, if anything, 
would codification add in a system that already prided itself on not being 
formalistic? Or to put the question another way, why was it anticipated that 
revenue would be raised? 
After all, whether economic substance is a statutory requirement or not, the 
Internal Revenue Service can invoke anti-avoidance doctrines, including 
economic substance, and courts can apply them. Indeed, it was understood 
forever, or so it seemed, that the Internal Revenue Code is to be enforced with 
the aid of several overlapping judicial anti-avoidance doctrines: substance-
over-form (the substance, not form, of a transaction should determine tax 
consequences127); step transaction (formally discrete, but substantively related, 
steps should be collapsed into one transaction to determine tax results128); 
sham transaction (a transaction having no purpose other than achieving 
particular tax results should be disregarded for tax purposes129); business 
purpose (a transaction that in form is business-related should not be honored if 
 
 125. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409(a), 
124 Stat. 1029, 1067 (amending Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)). 
 126. The Congressional Budget Office estimated penalties from codification totaling $4.2 
billion in 2016. See CBO Estimates Distribution of Health Insurance Mandate Penalties, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, Apr. 22, 2010, available at LEXIS, 2010 TNT 78-32. The Joint Committee staff 
estimated $4.5 billion for the period 2010–2019. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH 
CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE 
TO H.R. 4872, THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED 3 (Comm. Print 2010). One 
reader of an early draft questioned my reference to $4.5 billion as a “small” amount, but, in the 
context of overall budgets over ten years, that really is a drop in the bucket. 
 127. Substance-over-form language is pervasive in American jurisprudence, but on many 
issues it is accepted that form controls. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88 (holding that 
tax results of incorporating a partnership are governed by form). 
 128. See, e.g., Am. Bantam Car Co. v. Comm’r, 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff’d per curiam, 177 
F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949) (considering whether incorporation and subsequent changes in stock 
ownership should be treated as single transaction for purposes of analysis under what is now 
I.R.C. § 351). 
 129. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (holding that leveraged annuity 
arrangement that made no economic sense apart from anticipated tax consequences was a sham, 
and that purported interest payments should therefore not have been deductible). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY RESPONSES TO TAX AVOIDANCE 23 
it lacks a non-tax purpose130); and economic substance (a transaction lacking 
economic substance, looking to both objective and subjective criteria, should 
not be honored131). 
Before 2010, however, only bits and pieces of these doctrines had appeared 
in statutes and regulations, like the partnership disguised sale statute described 
earlier.132 Several arguments were advanced to support broader codification. 
For one thing, it was argued that codification would strengthen courts’ 
application of anti-avoidance doctrines. Some judges had always been gung ho 
about doing so, but, for a variety of reasons, others had been bewildered or 
openly hostile.133 (Although reversed on appeal, several courts had concluded 
they had no authority to apply uncodified anti-avoidance principles.134) But if 
Congress tells the judiciary it must apply an economic substance test—if a 
textualist is told statutorily that she should not apply textualism in interpreting 
statutes135—even a reluctant judge will have to go through the motions.136 
In addition, Professor Ellen Aprill noted the positive effect codification 
could have on the Internal Revenue Service and the enforcement of tax laws 
generally: “Codifying these standards . . . will give administrative officers 
greater ability to attack taxpayer transactions.”137 Judicial responses are 
“unpredictable, episodic, and ex post,”138 limited, as they are, to resolving 
 
 130. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935) (holding that transaction which, in 
form, seemed to be a corporate reorganization should be disregarded because it lacked a corporate 
level business purpose). 
 131. See, e.g., ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 132. See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 116, at 1946–47. Reluctance to conclude that a 
technically structured transaction does not work is understandable, particularly if judges are not 
tax experts. Judicial inconsistency is exacerbated by the multiple fora in which tax cases may be 
brought—Tax Court, Court of Federal Claims, federal district court—and the many appellate 
courts, with their sometimes conflicting decisions, add to doctrinal confusion. 
 134. See, e.g., Coltec Indus. Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 752–56 (2004), vacated, 
454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 135. See Galle, supra note 19, at 372. 
 136. Maybe it will not matter. Chirelstein and Zelenak noted the following: 
[A]lthough codification would prevent a court from concluding that the doctrine does not 
exist, courts would remain free to conclude that the doctrine is not relevant in particular 
situations. And even when they did find the doctrine relevant, courts would remain free to 
find meaningful changes in economic positions and substantial nontax purposes in highly 
dubious circumstances. 
Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 116, at 1950. The latter point is clearly right, and any 
appellate review would be under a clearly erroneous standard. But a determination as to 
whether an economic substance doctrine is relevant is presumably at least in part a legal issue, 
with more stringent appellate review therefore applicable. 
 137. Ellen P. Aprill, Tax Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality: Codifying Judicial Doctrines, 54 
SMU L. REV. 9, 20 (2001). 
 138. Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081, 2087 (2005). 
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particular disputes and constrained by the adversarial nature of those disputes. 
(Poorly argued cases do not lead to the development of well-considered 
doctrine.) In contrast, the Service fights shelters on an everyday basis. Of 
course it can invoke judicially created doctrines anyway, but, in the allocation 
of authority, codification is arguably a point in the Service’s favor.139 
A further, and even more compelling, argument for codification was that 
courts applying an economic substance doctrine had not been consistent in 
their understanding of the components of that doctrine.140 Did the doctrine 
have two prongs or three? Were objective and subjective components of the 
doctrine to be applied conjunctively or disjunctively? (That is, for a transaction 
to be honored, did it have to satisfy both a subjective and an objective test, or 
was it enough to satisfy one or the other?) With federal courts of appeals 
applying the doctrine in varying ways, taxpayers in different parts of the 
United States were effectively subject to different standards in applying what 
was, after all, federal tax law. The Supreme Court could have established 
consistency in application of judicially created doctrines, of course, but the 
Justices would not have undertaken that task with enthusiasm. In general, 
Supreme Court Justices want to avoid tax issues—especially complex, 
technical ones.141 
The arguments did not all favor codification, however. Skeptics, including 
Bush administration officials and many commentators from the academy and 
the bar, advanced a number of arguments against codification that went beyond 
redundancy (i.e., that the doctrines already existed, so what was the point?). 
Some complained about “the ambiguous and untrustworthy application” of 
economic substance doctrine in general.142 Indeed, Professor Leandra 
 
 139. Moreover, if the Service makes a fact-dependent determination about economic 
substance, a reviewing court would generally apply an “abuse of discretion” standard. See Aprill, 
supra note 137, at 20–22. 
 140. A similar point could have been made about other anti-avoidance doctrines as well. For 
example, what standard should determine when multiple steps are to be collapsed into a single 
transaction? See, e.g., Am. Bantam Car Co. v. Comm’r, 11 T.C. 397, 405–06 (1948), aff’d per 
curiam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949) (noting that some courts looked to mutual interdependence 
of the steps; others required a binding commitment; and so on). 
 141. See Martin D. Ginsburg, A Uniquely Distinguished Service, 10 GREEN BAG 173, 174 
(2007) (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg in her pre-judicial life: “I don’t read tax cases.”); Erik M. 
Jensen, Of Crud and Dogs, 58 TAX NOTES 1257 (1993) (quoting several justices disparaging tax 
cases). 
 142. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 116, at 1948. One might have thought, however, that 
the ambiguous nature of the doctrine in its uncodified form might have been a justification for 
codification and clarification. But see Allen D. Madison, Rationalizing Tax Law by Breaking the 
Addiction to Economic Substance, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 441, 476 (2011) (arguing that the doctrine, 
in either its judicial or codified form, “operates like a hand grenade where a bug spray will do”). 
Professor Madison argues that the codified doctrine is not rule-like, and it “makes the tax law 
vague, uncertain, and fallacious.” Id. 
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Lederman argued that courts should abandon the doctrine because it was too 
easily manipulated.143 The ABA Section of Taxation said, in 2007, that other 
mechanisms, especially disclosure of suspect transactions, worked better: “The 
legislative and regulatory actions imposing greater transparency are having the 
intended effect of limiting aggressive transactions while at the same time 
allowing taxpayers to engage in tax planning to minimize their taxes 
legally.”144 In contrast, uncertain doctrines can deter tax planning, and tax 
planning is legitimate (and, from the standpoint of the tax bar, certainly 
desirable) behavior.145 
Most important, many skeptics were concerned that codification could 
hinder the fight against shelters by taking away flexibility. Judicial doctrines 
can evolve to deal with changing circumstances and can adapt to new 
hypertechnical readings of statutes in a way that targeted or outcomes-oriented 
legislation cannot.146 Codifying economic substance would, it was argued, 
make the doctrine rule-like. Define “economic substance” rigidly, and 
imaginative shelter architects will provide for the minimum substance required 
by the statute.147 Besides, if only one anti-avoidance doctrine is codified, might 
taxpayers and courts not infer that other anti-avoidance doctrines were 
disfavored?148 
Reflecting the second Bush administration’s hostility to codification, an 
Internal Revenue Service official noted in 2007 that, if the economic substance 
or business purpose doctrine had been codified in 1935, when the Supreme 
Court in Gregory v. Helvering149 enunciated the business purpose test, the 
 
 143. Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 389, 392 (2010). 
Professor Lederman recommended instead that courts look to whether claimed tax benefits were 
consistent with the congressional intent behind the controlling Code provisions. Id. 
 144. Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Taxation, Economic Substance Codification: ABA Has 
“Substantial Reservations”, 115 TAX NOTES 389, 391 (2007) (critiquing doctrine as proposed in 
2005). 
 145. But see supra note 18 (quoting Professor Weisbach about how tax planning is societally 
wasteful). 
 146. See, e.g., Bernard Wolfman, Why Economic Substance Is Better Left Uncodified, 104 
TAX NOTES 445, 445 (2004) (complaining that codifying a “rigid or formulaic” version of 
economic substance would be constraining). 
 147. See Steven A. Bank, Codifying Judicial Doctrines: No Cure for Rules But More Rules?, 
54 SMU L. REV. 37, 41 (2001) (“The adoption of more rules may be seen as an invitation to 
structure a transaction that strictly complies with the letter of such rules, but only loosely, if at all, 
comports with the underlying justification.”). 
 148. Might codification of an economic substance doctrine suggest that, say, substance-over-
form principles should not be invoked? What was the point of codifying only one judicially 
created doctrine unless Congress wanted to favor one over the others? But see infra note 181 and 
accompanying text (noting that Joint Committee report concludes codification of economic 
substance was not intended to lessen the importance of other doctrines). 
 149. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
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doctrine would have been inadequate to deal with later generations of abusive 
activity: “Given the imagination and energy with which tax shelters seem to be 
evolving, . . . it’s useful to let the organic nature of the economic substance 
doctrine also evolve.”150 Although the government had had a mixed record in 
shelter litigation over the years, by the time of that statement it had compiled a 
string of victories relying on uncodified doctrines.151 
B. The 2010 Codification 
In its judicial form, the economic substance doctrine had generally been 
considered to have a subjective prong (looking to whether a taxpayer’s motives 
were largely tax-based) and an objective one (looking at a transaction’s 
expected economic effects apart from tax consequences). But courts had 
disagreed about how the two prongs fit together—whether they should be 
applied conjunctively or not—and whether another prong might exist as 
well.152 The Third Circuit in 1998 explained its understanding of the concept in 
this way: “[T]hese distinct aspects of the economic [substance doctrine] do not 
constitute discrete prongs of a ‘rigid two-step analysis,’ but rather represent 
related factors both of which inform the analysis of whether the transaction had 
sufficient substance, apart from its tax consequences, to be respected for tax 
purposes.”153 That is fuzzy, and other courts had applied the doctrine with 
different emphases.154 
1. The Statute 
In the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,155 signed by 
President Obama on March 30, 2010, Congress codified aspects of the 
doctrine, generally applicable to transactions entered into after that date, in 
 
 150. Heidi Glenn, IRS Official, Practitioners Pan Economic Substance Codification, 115 TAX 
NOTES 888, 888 (2007) (quoting William C. Sabin, Jr., senior legal counsel in the IRS Large and 
Midsize Business Division). 
 151. See Audrey Nutt, O’Connor Cites Justice Gains in Combating Tax Shelters, 115 TAX 
NOTES 697, 697–98 (2007); Susan Simmonds, Government Continues Winning Streak in Shelter 
Litigation, 115 TAX NOTES 913, 913–14 (2007). 
 152. See Jerald David August, The Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine, Part I, 
BUS. ENTITIES, Sept./Oct. 2010, at 4, 21 (noting that the Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and Federal 
Circuits had applied a two-pronged conjunctive test; the Fourth and Eighth required that only one 
prong be satisfied for economic substance to exist; and the Ninth and Tenth had applied an “all 
factors” approach). 
 153. ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 154. See Amanda L. Yoder, Note, One Prong, Two Prong, Many Prongs: A Look into the 
Economic Substance Doctrine, 75 MO. L. REV. 1409, 1419–24 (2010). 
 155. Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409, 124 Stat. 1029, 1067. I earlier wrote about some of these 
issues in Erik M. Jensen, Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine, 28 J. TAX’N 
INVESTMENTS, Winter 2011, at 89. 
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order to (as a report from the Joint Committee on Taxation put it) “clarif[y] 
and enhance[]” the doctrine.156 
The statute is chock-full of interpretive issues, and it makes sense to quote 
chunks of newly designated § 7701(o): 
(o) Clarification of economic substance doctrine 
(1) Application of doctrine. In the case of any transaction to which the 
economic substance doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as 
having economic substance only if— 
(A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income 
tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and 
(B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax 
effects) for entering into such transaction. 
(2) Special rule where taxpayer relies on profit potential 
(A) In general. The potential for profit of a transaction shall be taken into 
account in determining whether the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) 
of paragraph (1) are met with respect to the transaction only if the present 
value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction is 
substantial in relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits that 
would be allowed if the transaction were respected. 
* * * 
(5) Definitions and special rules 
For purposes of this subsection— 
(A) Economic substance doctrine. The term “economic substance doctrine” 
means the common law doctrine under which tax benefits under subtitle A 
with respect to a transaction are not allowable if the transaction does not have 
economic substance or lacks a business purpose. 
(B) Exception for personal transactions of individuals. In the case of an 
individual, paragraph (1) shall apply only to transactions entered into in 
connection with a trade or business or an activity engaged in for the production 
of income. 
 
 156. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION 
WITH THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT,” 152 (Comm. Print 2010). It has 
been suggested that the new statute “does not codify the [economic substance doctrine] but rather 
codifies a precondition to taxpayer’s escaping the [doctrine].” Henry Stow Lovejoy et al., Foreign 
Tax Credits, Economic Substance and the Future, ABA SEC. OF TAX’N, COMM. ON BANKING 
AND SAVINGS INST. (Feb. 17, 2012). That is technically true, as the discussion below will 
demonstrate, but, since almost everyone refers to the codification of the doctrine, I will use that 
terminology as well. 
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(C) Determination of application of doctrine not affected. The determination of 
whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be 
made in the same manner as if this subsection had never been enacted. 
(D) Transaction. The term “transaction” includes a series of transactions.157 
Paragraphs (1), (2)(A), and (5) will be important in the following discussion. 
As important as—maybe even more important than—the codified, 
substantive rules, was the associated penalty regime. Rather than simply 
relying on the existing accuracy-related penalties, Congress provided that the 
new rules are enforced through a strict-liability penalty—twenty percent of the 
underpayments of tax attributable to a transaction lacking economic substance 
if the matter had been disclosed in a return or in a statement attached to a 
return, forty percent otherwise.158 (Disclosure thus helps, but it has its own 
obvious downside.) Congress specifically provided that the “reasonable cause 
exception for underpayments” does not apply to transactions that fail the 
economic substance test.159 
2. The Effects of Codification 
If the economic substance and business purpose doctrines existed anyway, 
did codification matter? (The economic substance doctrine is defined as 
encompassing both economic substance and business purpose, although I will 
refer only to economic substance in the subsequent discussion.160) At one level, 
the answer might have seemed to be “no.” Economic substance is economic 
 
 157. I.R.C. § 7701(o) (Supp. 2010). 
 158. See I.R.C. § 6662(a) (2006) (setting out the generally applicable 20% penalty for 
understatements); id. § 6662(b)(6) (Supp. 2010) (defining as an understatement covered by the 
rule “[a]ny disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic 
substance (within the meaning of section 7701(o)) or failing to meet the requirements of any 
similar rule of law”); id. § 6662(i) (increasing the penalty to 40% for any “nondisclosed 
noneconomic substance transactions”—i.e., “transaction[s] described in subsection (b)(6) with 
respect to which the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment are not adequately disclosed in the 
return nor in a statement attached to the return”). Practitioner Kathleen DeLaney Thomas has 
criticized the strict-liability penalty as unnecessary, overlapping with existing penalties, adding 
complexity, creating uncertainty in application, and unfairly treating taxpayers worse than other 
tax shelter investors to whom the strict-liability penalty does not apply. See Kathleen DeLaney 
Thomas, The Case Against a Strict Liability Economic Substance Penalty, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
445, 448–49 (2011). 
 159. See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(2) (2006); see also I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2) (Supp. 2010) (eliminating 
the reasonable cause exception for “reportable transaction understatement[s]”). 
 160. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A) (Supp. 2010). The collapsing of the two doctrines is legitimate, at 
least insofar as the economic substance doctrine is being applied in a business context. Having a 
non-tax business purpose would be necessary to satisfy the subjective prong of the economic 
substance doctrine anyway. 
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substance, or so one might think. And by its terms § 7701(o) purports to be 
merely a “clarification” of a common law doctrine.161 
For one very important thing, however, the strict-liability penalty by itself 
makes people pay attention162: no opinion of counsel (or anything else) is 
going to protect a taxpayer against the penalty if the transaction is deemed to 
lack economic substance. And remember that, although the statute does not say 
this, the Joint Committee report referred to the codification as “enhanc[ing]” as 
well as “clarif[ying].”163 Indeed, the codification is expected to bring in 
revenue,164 which certainly sounds like an enhancement.165 
Another important enhancement is that § 7701(o) gives mandatory content 
to the economic substance test. In form, the “common law doctrine” is picked 
up,166 but it must be applied with a conjunctive two-part test, thereby resolving 
judicial disagreement on that point.167 To have economic substance, a 
transaction must “meaningful[ly]” change a taxpayer’s economic position (an 
objective test), and the taxpayer must have a “substantial” non-tax purpose for 
the transaction (a subjective test).168 If either component is lacking, the strict-
liability penalty applies (either twenty percent or forty percent, as applicable) 
to any understatement associated with a “transaction to which the economic 
substance doctrine is relevant . . . .”169 
In short, if you participate in such a transaction, if the transaction does not 
have economic substance, and if you underpay tax as a result, you are subject 
to a penalty, regardless of your good intentions. It is not that your motivations 
are irrelevant: you do need to have a “substantial purpose (apart from Federal 
income tax effects)” to have economic substance.170 But if you fail the 
 
 161. Id. § 7701(o). 
 162. See supra note 158. 
 163. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 165. See Jodi J. Schwartz, Economic-Substance Doctrine and Subchapter C: What, Me 
Worry?, TAXES—THE TAX MAGAZINE, Mar. 2011, at 113, 117 (“Despite indications in the JCT 
and House Reports that the codification . . . was generally not intended to effect a significant 
change in existing law, . . . this is far from clear from the statutory text and, to a large extent, the 
JCT and House Reports themselves.”). 
 166. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A). 
 167. I suppose there can still be judicial disagreement in the following respect. One might 
read the statute as setting a minimum, and a particular court could determine that other 
requirements must be satisfied as well for a transaction to have economic substance. But even 
then the objective and subjective requirements must be satisfied conjunctively, something that 
was not previously obvious to all courts. See, e.g., supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text 
(noting analysis in Black & Decker). 
 168. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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objective test, good motivations and regular church attendance171 will not save 
you from the strict-liability penalty (nor, as I indicated earlier, will a favorable 
legal opinion about the transaction’s merits). In addition, if the Service raises 
an economic substance issue along the way, it will have raised the stakes 
sufficiently, because of the possible strict-liability penalty, to increase the 
likelihood of settlement on terms favorable to the government.172 
Even without the strict-liability penalty, codification was clearly intended 
to increase the force of the doctrine.173 Think back to Black & Decker, 
discussed in Part II. For purposes of the summary judgment motion, B&D had 
conceded that the only reason for entering into the contingent liability 
transaction was favorable tax results, and it convinced the trial judge that 
sufficient, apparently indisputable, non-tax economic effects existed to justify 
summary judgment in its favor.174 With codification of the economic substance 
doctrine, however, that concession would be fatal today (assuming the doctrine 
is relevant to begin with, as it would be175), and it therefore would not be 
made. 
In addition, as noted earlier, for judges unsure about their authority to 
apply extra-statutory principles, codification of economic substance makes the 
extra-statutory statutory, and, for those judges unsympathetic to government 
arguments, codification obligates them to take economic substance 
 
 171. Or, for a corporation, the corporate equivalent of regular church attendance. 
 172. See Jonathan M. Prokup, Codification of the Economic-Substance Doctrine—A 
Legislative Paradox, TAXES—THE TAX MAGAZINE, Apr. 2011, at 17, 22. 
[W]here the government improperly attempts to disallow tax benefits on economic-
substance grounds, and a court analyzes a transaction on that basis, even if the taxpayer 
ultimately prevails, the government has arguably planted a flag that the doctrine is 
“relevant” to such transactions. 
  As a result, in future federal tax examinations, taxpayers face the risk that revenue 
agents will attempt to disallow the benefits of a transaction on the grounds that it lacks 
economic substance solely for the purpose of putting at issue the possibility of a strict 
liability penalty. Except for the most stout-hearted (or well-resourced) taxpayers, the risk 
of a 20- or 40-percent . . . penalty may be enough to coerce the taxpayer into settling . . . 
on unfavorable terms. 
Id. 
 173. See Amy S. Elliott, Practitioners Propose Guidance on Economic Substance Penalty, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 16, 2010, available at LEXIS, 2010 TNT 220-3 (quoting tax lawyer 
Monte Jackel: “I do not see how one could say you apply the statute as if it had never been 
enacted when it uses terms [like ‘meaningful’ and ‘substantial’] that were not part of the law 
before the statute became law.”). 
 174. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
 175. The appellate court did remand Black & Decker for sham-transaction scrutiny. See supra 
note 51 and accompanying text. As discussed below, however, it is unlikely that a Cottage 
Savings transaction would be treated as one for which the economic substance doctrine would be 
relevant. See infra notes 197–201 and accompanying text. 
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seriously.176 It is true that “[t]he determination of whether the economic 
substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be made in the same 
manner as if this subsection had never been enacted,”177 but that language 
cannot mean that a judge has discretion to ignore a doctrine she does not 
like.178 And, also as noted earlier, codification affects the allocation of 
authority between the courts and the Service. Codification gives the Service 
the power to police the system on an everyday basis.179 
Furthermore, codification does not take away the Service’s power to 
invoke other doctrines. Whatever the scope of the economic substance 
doctrine, the Joint Committee report makes it clear that codification was not 
intended to limit the powers otherwise available to the Service or to courts to 
curb abusive behavior.180 Other judicially created doctrines that have been used 
in the past can continue to be invoked.181 In fact, at a minimum, it seems to be 
essential that the substance-over-form and step-transaction doctrines be applied 
first to determine what the “transaction” is that will be evaluated under the 
codified economic substance doctrine. 
What the full effect of codification will be continues to be debated. In 
2010, IRS Associate Chief Counsel (Corporate) William Alexander said that 
the doctrine should not apply to transactions where it would have been 
irrelevant in the past and, as a result, codification should have little real-world 
effect.182 But many practitioners are skeptical that the effect will be so 
limited—in part because of uncertainty about the scope of the codified doctrine 
(what was the point if codification added little?) and in large part because of 
the strict-liability penalty.183 
In any event, Mr. Alexander was not always so reassuring, noting, for 
example, that economic substance “is a living doctrine, and in order to have 
some vitality, it has to have the freedom to be explored and developed.”184 At 
 
 176. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text. 
 177. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (Supp. 2010). 
 178. To be sure, artful judges can minimize the effects of economic substance codification. 
See supra note 136 (quoting Chirelstein and Zelenak). But, after codification, the doctrine cannot 
be ignored. 
 179. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. 
 180. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 156, at 155. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Amy S. Elliot, Codification of Economic Substance Should Have Minimal Effect on 
Practice, IRS Official Says, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 15, 2010, available at LEXIS, 2010 TNT 
90-2; Jeremiah Coder, Determining Relevance of Economic Substance Doctrine Is Not Hard, 
Alexander Says, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 3, 2010, available at LEXIS, 2010 TNT 107-2; Elliott, 
supra note 173 (quoting Alexander: “The economic substance doctrine asks, ‘Are you in a real 
investment?’”). 
 183. See Amy S. Elliot, Practitioners Skeptical of IRS Assurances on Economic Substance 
Relevance, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 12, 2010, available at LEXIS, 2010 TNT 133-2. 
 184. Elliott, supra note 173. 
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one level, that is an unsurprising way to describe what even the statute refers to 
as a “common law doctrine,” which of course can evolve.185 But that also 
means statutory meaning can evolve—intelligent design has its limits—and 
that idea is unsettling to some. As one practitioner put it, “[a] living doctrine 
simply cannot coexist with a strict liability penalty.”186 
3. Interpretive Issues 
Much of the grousing about economic substance codification has been 
overdone—the parade of horribles imagined by some commentators seems to 
be the results of hallucinating (e.g., that every transaction might be subject to 
special scrutiny because of codification)—but that is not to say that no serious 
uncertainties exist. This section looks at a few of the many interpretive 
questions arising from the new statutory language. 
To what transactions does the doctrine apply? The conjunctive two-part 
rule is to apply “[i]n the case of any transaction to which the economic-
substance doctrine is relevant,”187 and “[t]he determination of whether the 
economic substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be made in the 
same manner as if this subsection had never been enacted.”188 That is a 
confusing proposition; pretend to ignore something that you really cannot 
ignore.189 (It is like saying, “Don’t think about a bear.”) This should mean at a 
minimum, however, that everyday transactions will not be scrutinized under 
the codified doctrine. (Purely personal transactions are explicitly not 
covered.190) 
But what about slightly more exotic transactions? Can one conclude that, 
simply because economic substance analysis has not been applied in reported 
cases, the doctrine does not apply? Or do we need to find cases or rulings 
explicitly rejecting such scrutiny? And how specific does the ruling body have 
to have been in referring to the economic substance doctrine?191 Does the 
 
 185. See infra text accompanying note 193 (quoting from IRS notice). 
 186. Elliott, supra note 173 (quoting tax lawyer Kimberly S. Blanchard). 
 187. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (Supp. 2010). 
 188. Id. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
 189. See supra text accompanying note 156 (noting the intended “enhancement” effect of 
codification). 
 190. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(B). 
 191. For example, the New York State Bar Association Tax Section has recommended 
guidance to the effect that the economic substance doctrine ought to be treated as having been 
applied only if a court “analyzed both the economic substance and business or non-tax purpose of 
such a transaction . . . and found it lacked either or both.” Peter H. Blessing, NYSBA Tax Section 
Recommends More Guidance on Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine, TAX NOTES 
TODAY, Jan. 5, 2011, at 2, available at LEXIS, 2011 TNT 5-14 [hereinafter NYSBA Tax 
Section] (containing January 5, 2011, Report on Codification of the Economic Substance 
Doctrine). In the New York tax bar’s view, judicial consideration of other anti-avoidance 
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administrative practice of the IRS count for this purpose? For example, if the 
government has not raised economic substance arguments over the years, and 
courts have therefore been silent on the issue, is the government estopped from 
raising the issue now? One would think that, in nearly all cases where the 
government did not raise economic substance issues in the past, it was because 
there were no serious economic substance issues in the first place. But can we 
be sure about that? Finally, what about the situation posited by practitioner 
Monte Jackel, based on a recent decision: “If one court deems it relevant to 
discuss the economic substance doctrine when the case can be decided on 
narrow technical grounds . . . , but the court to which the decision is appealed 
refuses to address the doctrine, does that mean the doctrine is or is not relevant 
in resolving future cases with similar facts and issues?”192 Good questions all. 
In a notice published late in 2010, the IRS announced it will continue to do 
the following: 
[A]nalyze when the economic substance doctrine will apply in the same 
fashion as it did prior to the enactment of section 7701(o). If authorities, prior 
to the enactment of section 7701(o), provided that the economic substance 
doctrine was not relevant to whether certain tax benefits are allowable, the IRS 
will continue to take the position that the economic substance doctrine is not 
relevant to whether those tax benefits are allowable. The IRS anticipates that 
the case law regarding the circumstances in which the economic substance 
doctrine is relevant will continue to develop. Consistent with section 
7701(o)(5)(C), codification of the economic substance doctrine should not 
affect the ongoing development of authorities on this issue.193 
That statement of policy, while helpful, is not responsive to many of the 
concerns, particularly insofar “as the circumstances in which the economic 
substance doctrine is relevant will continue to develop.”194 
In some cases it should be easy to conclude that economic substance is an 
issue. The statutory fix for contingent liability shelters like that in Black & 
Decker effectively shut those shelters down, but, if it mattered any longer, that 
sort of transaction would also be subject to the penalty regime under the 
 
doctrines, like substance-over-form, should not be considered in applying economic substance. 
Id. 
 192. Monte A. Jackel, When Is the Economic Substance Doctrine Relevant?, 132 TAX NOTES 
77, 77 (2011) (discussing Merck & Co. v. United States, 652 F.3d 475 (3d Cir. 2011), where the 
Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s conclusion but without addressing the economic 
substance doctrine applied by the lower court); see also Richard M. Lipton, Flextronics, Sundrup, 
and the Application of the Economic Substance Doctrine, 114 J. TAX’N 160, 166–67 (2011) 
(criticizing arguably inconsistent analysis of the economic substance doctrine in two recent Tax 
Court memorandum decisions, and worrying about the significance of that inconsistency in 
applying the codified economic substance doctrine). 
 193. IRS Notice 2010-62, 2010-2 C.B. 411. 
 194. Id. 
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economic substance doctrine. Remember that in Black & Decker the appellate 
court remanded the case for consideration of sham transaction issues,195 a 
factor that goes to the relevance of the economic substance doctrine. If the 
doctrine is relevant, as it surely would be, the transaction would fail the 
conjunctive economic substance tests, if only because there was no non-tax 
purpose for the transaction. Slam dunk. 
But a set of facts like Cottage Savings presents a decidedly more difficult 
set of issues, leading to a counterintuitive result if such a transaction were 
attempted today. Even though the transactions in that case would clearly fail 
both subjective and objective tests—the only purpose was the hoped-for tax 
benefits, the recognition of losses, and there was no non-tax, economic effect 
at all from the exchanges—lack of economic substance matters not a whit if 
the transaction is not one “to which the economic substance doctrine is 
relevant.”196 
And the Supreme Court’s treatment of the issues in Cottage Savings 
strongly suggests the doctrine is not relevant. The Court devoted almost all of 
its energy to interpreting a regulation, not anti-avoidance doctrines. The Court 
did refer to the “economic substance” doctrine in one part of its opinion, but it 
did not take the doctrine seriously, nor had the Commissioner done so.197 The 
Court noted that the Commissioner had raised the argument “in one sentence in 
a footnote in his brief without offering further explanation.”198 Without more, 
the Court was unwilling to question the economic substance of exchanges 
between unrelated, sophisticated financial institutions.199 With that 
background, when we make “[t]he determination of whether the economic 
substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction . . . in the same manner as if this 
subsection had never been enacted,”200 the conclusion appears obvious: the 
Supreme Court gave its blessing to the desired tax consequences of the 
exchanges. How could the economic substance doctrine possibly be 
relevant?201 
 
 195. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 196. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (Supp. 2010). There were real economic losses in Cottage Savings, 
and perhaps that should affect the way we think about the case. But the transactions in that case 
nevertheless lacked economic substance as that term is defined in the codification. 
 197. See Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 567–68 (1991). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
 201. But see Patricia A. Thompson, AICPA Seeks More Guidance on Codification of 
Economic Substance Doctrine, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 18, 2011, available at LEXIS, 2011 
TNT 14-20 (including letter from American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated 
January 18, 2011, urging Service to issue further guidance on codification). 
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“[C]hanges in a meaningful way . . . the taxpayer’s economic position” 
and “substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects).”202 The 
questions about “meaningful” and “substantial” ask themselves. Fuzzy though 
this language may be, it is no fuzzier than other legal terms we have to deal 
with (the “reasonable man,” for example). For that matter, it is no fuzzier than 
the economic substance doctrine in its common law form, and to the extent that 
fuzziness is desirable for purposes of deterrence, this language works. (On the 
other hand, fuzzy concepts are easier to deal with if a strict-liability penalty is 
not hovering overhead.) 
Profit potential to satisfy conjunctive tests. A taxpayer need not use profit 
potential to satisfy either the objective or the subjective test of the codified 
doctrine,203 but if the taxpayer does rely on profit potential, that potential is to 
be taken into account “only if the present value of the reasonably expected pre-
tax profit from the transaction is substantial in relation to the present value of 
the expected net tax benefits that would be allowed if the transaction were 
respected.”204 Whew! That statement seems straightforward enough in some 
respects, but it masks the extraordinary difficulties implicit in any present-
value analysis. The key word “substantial” adds uncertainty to the already 
uncertain mix. On the other hand, because the provision makes it clear that a 
taxpayer need not rely on profit potential, the sale of property at a loss, for 
example, is not deemed to fail economic substance merely because no potential 
for profit existed.205 
The meaning of “transaction.” The codification specifically provides that 
“[t]he term ‘transaction’ includes a series of transactions,”206 which 
presumably means that, in some cases, the step transaction doctrine might 
require treating a series of steps as part of a single, larger transaction, and that 
we would then look to see whether that larger transaction has economic 
substance. That is consistent with longtime understanding: you need to figure 
out what the “transaction” is before you test its legitimacy. 
Some commentators have asked whether the reverse might be the case as 
well—whether a single step in a series of related steps might have to satisfy 
economic substance requirements on its own.207 (That concern is attributable, 
 
 202. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (emphasis added). 
 203. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Living with the Codified Economic Substance Doctrine, 128 
TAX NOTES 731, 738 (2010) (“The . . . test recognizes that taxpayers often undertake transactions 
related to their businesses . . . that do not in isolation produce an identifiable profit stream . . . .”). 
 204. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
 205. Furthermore, assuming that the sale is for cash, rather than an exchange like that in 
Cottage Savings, one might question whether the transaction is one to be evaluated under the 
economic substance doctrine. See supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text. 
 206. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(D). 
 207. See Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 15 
(2000) (“In theory, by expanding or contracting the number of related events, a decisionmaker 
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in part, to a passage in the Joint Committee’s technical explanation that says 
codification “does not alter the court’s ability to aggregate, disaggregate, or 
otherwise recharacterize a transaction when applying the doctrine.”208) Break a 
transaction down too far—get to the level of the quark—and satisfying either 
of the conjunctive tests might be impossible.209 One obviously cannot provide 
a bright-line test to determine when a series of events rises to the level of a 
“transaction,” but the use of that term does imply that not every event is to be 
tested for economic substance. 
In comments, the ABA Section of Taxation has noted that “how the 
‘transaction’ is defined will have outcome-determinative consequences in 
many cases,”210 which is undoubtedly true. Additionally, the Section of 
Taxation recommended a presumption that “transaction” be broadly defined 
“to include a connected set of business, economic and investment 
objectives,”211 which is consistent with the traditional understanding of the 
step-transaction doctrine. 
But the ABA folks might be overly nervous about some of this. They 
provide as an example of a problematic “transaction” the sale of an asset at a 
loss: “In isolation, the sale will never generate a pre-tax profit and will always 
fail the economic substance test, resulting in disallowance of any loss 
deduction under section 165.”212 That worry is grossly overblown.213 To begin 
with, unless it has some worrisome attributes, such a transaction is almost 
certainly not one to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant.214 Even 
if the doctrine is relevant, a taxpayer need not rely on “profit potential” to 
demonstrate economic substance.215 Why would there not be economic 
substance anyway, when an asset is converted into cash (a pretty clear change 
 
could reach virtually any result it wanted under the doctrine.”); David P. Hariton, When and How 
Should the Economic Substance Doctrine Be Applied?, 60 TAX L. REV. 29, 40–41 (2006) (noting 
that legitimate transactions routinely include steps that, if evaluated by themselves, do not 
improve a taxpayer’s economic position). 
 208. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 156, at 153 (emphasis added). 
 209. See Jeremiah Coder, News Analysis: Tax Planning After Economic Substance 
Codification, 129 TAX NOTES 772, 773–74 (2010) (noting concerns of tax lawyer George M. 
Clarke III). 
 210. Charles H. Egerton, ABA Members Seek More Guidance on Codification of Economic 
Substance Doctrine, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 18, 2011, at 26, available at LEXIS, 2011 TNT 12-
13 (containing comments submitted to Internal Revenue Service on January 18, 2011, by 
members of the ABA Section of Taxation). 
 211. Id. at 28. 
 212. Id. at 27. 
 213. Professor McMahon calls it a “red herring[].” McMahon, supra note 203, at 742. 
 214. Or, in the alternative, the “transaction” ought to be the “overall acquisition, holding, and 
disposition of the property,” id., in which case economic substance almost certainly existed. 
 215. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A) (Supp. 2010). 
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in economic position216) and the taxpayer can demonstrate non-tax reasons for 
making the sale?217 
4. How Problematic Are Uncertainty and Lack of Guidance? 
Any new provision, even one billed as a “clarification,” is going to create 
some uncertainty. Government officials have tried to lessen concerns about 
codification of economic substance in their public pronouncements, but they 
have not been entirely successful. Whatever officials say now, a new set of 
officeholders might be more aggressive in interpreting economic substance. 
Is the lack of certainty with codification a problem, particularly if some of 
the doctrine is evolving? Uncertainty is an issue with any anti-abuse doctrine, 
of course, whether codified or not, and fuzziness does cause uncertainty in 
some situations. How could it not? Opponents of anti-avoidance doctrines have 
been condemning fuzziness and uncertainty for decades:218 Who knows 
whether a court will determine that substance diverges from form, or that two 
formally distinct transactions are one? 
Uncertainty is a legitimate doctrinal concern. Professor Weisbach has 
noted, “If [anti-abuse provisions] are not more certain than other approaches to 
solving the rules/standards/complexity problem, they are undesirable . . . . If 
they are more certain, they are desirable.”219 Would uncertainty be so great that 
legitimate business activity would be deterred? Or would a carefully drafted 
doctrine miss some abusive behavior? Ultimately, as Professor Aprill writes, 
“Deciding whether over-inclusion or under-inclusion produces the greatest 
danger is an empirical question—how many tax shelters and at what size 
would be stopped by codifying judicial doctrines versus how many legitimate 
transactions and at what size would be stopped by this codification.”220 We just 
do not know: “The [e]ffects of [u]ncertainty [a]re [u]ncertain.”221 
Although we have little data, uncertainty associated with judicial anti-
avoidance doctrines may have been more apparent than real, and one would 
expect the same to be true with the codified economic substance doctrine. As 
good (or bad) tax professionals, we can come up with an unlimited number of 
tricky hypotheticals to test the scope of the doctrine, but uncertainty of this sort 
does not affect the everyday practice of the vast majority of American tax 
 
 216. It cannot be the case that a value-for-value exchange—i.e., the normal exchange—should 
automatically be treated as not changing a taxpayer’s economic position in a meaningful way, or 
no exchange would ever have economic substance. 
 217. Would getting rid of an underperforming asset not always be treated as being justified 
for non-tax purposes? 
 218. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 879 
(1999). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Aprill, supra note 137, at 34. 
 221. Weisbach, supra note 18, at 247. 
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professionals. Even for those whose practices push envelopes, the difficulties 
may be manageable. Peter Canellos has noted that, 
[a]lthough in theory the line between a tax shelter and an aggressively 
structured real transaction may appear difficult to draw, in actuality the 
distinction is generally rather easy to establish . . . . That is why it may be hard 
to define shelters legislatively . . . but so easy for courts to determine whether 
an actual transaction is a shelter.222 
A good tax practitioner will know it when she sees it. 
Practitioner Canellos’s intuitions correspond to those of academics. 
Professor Weisbach believes “tax lawyers are sufficiently trained and share a 
sufficiently common understanding of the tax law to be able to determine 
which transactions anti-abuse rules target and which they do not.”223 Of course, 
poorly trained or inexperienced lawyers are going to feel uncomfortable with 
fuzziness, but they will get over it—or find another way to fill their days. 
Professor Graeme Cooper came to the same conclusion about codified general 
anti-avoidance rules in other countries. Although many had worried about 
GAARs being “‘loose canon[s]’ on the tax ship of State, injuring friend and 
foe alike,”224 he concluded that “the experience with a GAAR does not support 
the worst fears of tax advisors.”225 
In fact, anti-avoidance doctrines can support simplification and certainty. 
No set of explicit rules can cover every conceivable transaction, and anti-
avoidance doctrines can help avoid the proliferation of detailed (and therefore 
uncertain) rules drafted in response to particular, abusive transactions.226 It is 
hard to imagine the American tax system relying only on substantive rules.227 
Try to mesh a multitude of bright-line, but transaction-specific, rules into a 
coherent whole, and the monster that is the Internal Revenue Code will grow 
several more heads.228 
Besides, some uncertainty is valuable for the tax system; it deters 
taxpayers from getting too close to abusive territory.229 Such deterrence is one 
 
 222. Canellos, supra note 20, at 53–54. 
 223. Weisbach, supra note 218, at 881 (citing Daniel Halperin, Are Anti-Abuse Rules 
Appropriate?, 48 TAX LAW. 807, 809 (1995)). 
 224. Graeme S. Cooper, International Experience with General Anti-Avoidance Rules, 54 
SMU L. REV. 83, 117 (2001). 
 225. Id. GAARs have also “not proved to be the panacea of revenue authorities,” however. Id. 
 226. See Weisbach, supra note 218, at 865 (“[R]ules must systematically be more complex 
than standards.”). 
 227. It is of course also impossible to imagine the system relying only on general standards. 
See id. at 876. 
 228. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 229. Cf. David Weisbach, Is Knowledge of the Tax Law Socially Desirable? 2 (Univ. of Chi. 
Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 563, 2011) (“A criticism of the 
economic substance doctrine is that it makes it too hard for people to know what the law is. If 
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of the reasons many commentators opposed codifying judicially developed, 
anti-avoidance doctrines in the first place.230 Professor Weisbach goes farther 
than I would in condoning significant uncertainty, but I accept his basic points: 
“[W]e should have no presumption that reducing uncertainty . . . is a good 
thing . . . . We cannot say that uncertainty is necessarily bad and cannot say 
that we should not impose significant uncertainty if it is needed to implement 
strong anti-shelter doctrines.”231 
In any event, a combination of rules and standards appears inevitable, with 
standards coming into play “in situations where strict application of the rules 
produces perverse results.”232 The codification of economic substance, with its 
evolving doctrines, has the arguably happy consequence of retaining the 
flexibility that existed over the years with judicial, anti-avoidance doctrines,233 
while adding some much-needed clarifications to the doctrines (such as 
making clear that the objective and subjective tests for economic substance 
should be applied conjunctively).234 In a very real sense, the codification has 
combined the benefits advanced by supporters of codification with the benefits 
of an evolving, flexible doctrine. 
Members of the tax bar had asked the Treasury and the Service for an 
angel list of transactions to which the economic substance doctrine will not 
apply, but the government refused.235 The government’s recalcitrance has 
caused more consternation than is justified, however; there are reasons for the 
Treasury’s position. If some particular transactions were omitted from a list, 
for whatever reason,236 what might have been inferred about their status under 
 
knowledge of the tax law is undesirable, however, this criticism is muted or possibly even 
completely flipped.”); see also McMahon, supra note 203, at 753 (concluding that it is a good 
thing that detailed guidance about the economic substance codification is unlikely). “Detailed 
regulations implementing codification of the business purpose and economic substance doctrines 
would create their own ambiguities, uncertainty, and loopholes.” Id. 
 230. See supra notes 146–51 and accompanying text. 
 231. Weisbach, supra note 6, at 81. 
 232. Id. at 79. 
 233. See supra notes 146–51 and accompanying text. But see Prokup, supra note 172, at 23 
(“The codification of economic substance represents an unfortunate development in tax law, 
primarily because a vague statute that uses subjective standards to impose a strict-liability penalty 
has no place in a tax system that is based upon objective, form-based rules.”). It is true, of course, 
that some areas of tax law are quite formalistic. But as a whole, anti-avoidance doctrines have had 
such an important effect in American tax law precisely because form often does not control. 
 234. The clarification was needed if only because taxpayers in different parts of the country 
were subject to different versions of the economic substance doctrine. See supra notes 140–41 
and accompanying text. 
 235. See IRS Notice 2010-62, supra note 193 (“The Treasury Department and the IRS do not 
intend to issue general administrative guidance regarding the types of transactions to which the 
economic substance doctrine either applies or does not apply.”). 
 236. For one thing, a list obviously could not include transactions that had not yet been 
devised when the list was compiled. 
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the codified doctrine? The answer should be nothing at all, but many would 
have drawn a different inference. It would have been nice, perhaps, for the 
Treasury and the Service to have provided more examples, pro and con, but an 
exhaustive list would have been impossible.237 
Although commentators have worried that codification of economic 
substance might be invoked to challenge all sorts of transactions that have long 
been accepted, indeed encouraged, that cannot be a serious worry. For 
example, like-kind exchanges of appreciated property are common 
transactions, and they are clearly tax-motivated. Without Code § 1031, which 
makes such transactions tax-free except to the extent “boot” (property not of 
like kind) is involved, real-estate swaps would occur much less frequently,238 
and deferred “exchanges” would probably not occur in their present forms at 
all.239 But it would be absurd to think that, by codifying the economic 
substance doctrine and leaving § 1031 intact, Congress intended to call into 
question the legitimacy of these exchanges. These are transactions that are 
explicitly blessed by a Code provision.240 How could they possibly be 
transactions “to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant”?241 The 
Joint Committee report explaining codification emphasized that “[i]f the 
realization of the tax benefits of a transaction is consistent with the 
Congressional purpose or plan that the tax benefits were designed by Congress 
to effectuate, it is not intended that such tax benefits be disallowed.”242 Quite 
right. 
 
 237. See Coder, supra note 209, at 772 (quoting tax lawyer Julian Y. Kim, who argued that an 
angel list “could swallow the rule”). The New York tax bar recommended that the Service 
“enunciat[e] a few principles identifying broad categories of transactions to which the [doctrine] 
is not ‘relevant.’” NYSBA Tax Section, supra note 191, at 2. 
 238. In a down economy, they are not occurring very often anyway, but in strong economies 
they are common transactions and would not be so common were it not for I.R.C. § 1031. 
 239. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3) (2006). 
 240. See August, supra note 152, at 8 (“[I]f a transaction . . . falls within the Code language, it 
should be respected by the IRS and, ultimately, the courts.”). I.R.C. § 1031 has its academic 
critics, but it is unquestionably the case that Congress has given its institutional approval to like-
kind exchanges. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text (arguing that congressionally 
approved transactions ought not to be characterized as tax shelters, no matter how favorable the 
results). 
 241. See NYSBA Tax Section, supra note 191, at 3 (suggesting that guidance should provide 
that the economic substance doctrine is not relevant “where the circumstances of the transaction 
are such that the tax benefits are ‘clearly consistent’ with the provisions and purposes of the Code 
or Regulations”). 
 242. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 156, at 152 n.344. The report specifically 
lists several credits, like low-income housing credits (I.R.C § 42) and new markets tax credits 
(I.R.C. § 45D), as being exempt from economic substance scrutiny, on the ground that Congress 
had specifically provided for the credits. Id. 
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And it has always been understood that many tax-motivated decisions can 
coexist with the economic substance doctrine. For example, the Joint 
Committee report made it clear that “[t]he provision is not intended to alter the 
tax treatment of certain basic business transactions that, under longstanding 
judicial and administrative practice are respected, merely because the choice 
between meaningful economic alternatives is largely or entirely based on 
comparative tax advantages.”243 To illustrate this point, the report cites (1) the 
choice between debt and equity in capitalizing a business enterprise; (2) the 
choice between using a U.S. or a foreign corporation to make a foreign 
investment; (3) the choice to reorganize a corporate structure in a way 
recognized as a tax-free reorganization; and (4) the choice to use a related 
party in a transaction, assuming arm’s length standards are satisfied.244 
Taxpayers should continue to be able to make these decisions, and others,245 
without worrying about the economic substance doctrine.246 
 
 243. Id. at 152. But see id. at 153 (noting that “the fact that a transaction meets the 
requirements for specific treatment under any provision of the Code is not determinative of 
whether a transaction or series of transactions of which it is a part has economic substance”). I 
think that last passage is supposed to mean only that dotting all the i’s and crossing all the t’s is 
not enough, but the language reasonably makes some tax professionals nervous. 
 244. Id. at 152–53; Jerald David August, The Codification of the Economic Substance 
Doctrine, Part II, BUS. ENTITIES, Nov./Dec. 2010, at 4, 11. 
 245. Indeed, if the Code or regulations provide a taxpayer with an explicit choice, in the form 
of an election, the taxpayer ought to be able to make that choice—obviously doing so as to 
minimize tax liability—without worrying that the Service might invoke the economic substance 
doctrine. See NYSBA Tax Section, supra note 191, at 2 (urging that guidance make that point). 
 246. A 2005 proposal prepared by staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation recommended 
applying two-tiered economic substance analysis to transactions having any of six characteristics 
present in many tax shelters. The list, a catalog of potentially abusive deals, perhaps would have 
been a useful addition to the economic substance doctrine as ultimately codified: transactions: 
1) . . . in which (a) the taxpayer holds offsetting positions which substantially reduce the 
risk of loss, and (b) tax benefits would result from differing tax treatment of the positions; 
2) . . . which [are] structured to result in a disparity between basis and fair market value 
which creates or increases a loss or reduces a gain; 3) . . . which [are] structured to create 
or increase a gain in an asset any portion of which would not be recognized for Federal 
income tax purposes if the asset were sold at fair market value by the taxpayer (or a 
related person); 4) . . . which [are] structured to result in income for Federal income tax 
purposes to a tax-indifferent party for any period which is materially in excess of any 
economic income to such party with respect to the transaction for such period; 5) . . . in 
which the taxpayer disposes of property . . . which the taxpayer held for a period less than 
45 days; [or] 6) . . . which [are] structured to result in a deduction or loss which is 
otherwise allowable under the Code and which is not allowed for financial reporting 
purposes. 
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND 
REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 19–20 (Comm. Print 2005). Under the staff proposal, taxpayers 
would have had to demonstrate economic substance for a suspect transaction. Others would have 
been subject to traditional methods of scrutiny. 
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5. Further Thoughts 
Codification was clearly not intended to call into question the bona fides of 
transactions traditionally deemed legitimate, and it was not intended to call 
into question transactions unquestionably permitted by the Code. The strict-
liability penalty increases the stakes, to be sure—the Service is sensitive to this 
point247—but codification of economic substance still needs to be understood 
in a commonsensical way.248 Indeed, Professor Howard Abrams has argued 
that the breadth of the strict-liability penalties points toward narrowly reading 
the codification doctrine.249 Not everything should suddenly be up for grabs.250 
That is not to say, however, that codification matters not at all. If there is 
reason to worry about the legitimacy of a transaction, then economic substance 
considerations might be crucial. In general, lack of economic substance should 
be a serious issue only with transactions that would have been questionable 
without codification.251 But the strict-liability penalty makes it worthwhile for 
everyone to pay attention (as we should have been doing anyway). 
 
 247. See Rocco Femia et al., New IRS Internal Guidance on Codified Economic Substance 
Doctrine Offers Some Plusses for Taxpayers, 29 J. TAX’N INVESTMENTS, Fall 2011, at 31, 31. 
Femia and colleagues describe a July 15, 2011, directive from the IRS Large Business & 
International Division: “Guidance for Examiners and Managers on the Codified Economic 
Doctrine and Related Penalties.” Id. The directive is not binding, but, among other things, it 
provides what is in effect a safe harbor, listing four categories of transactions for which it would 
be inappropriate to raise the economic substance doctrine; provides that, pending further 
guidance, strict liability penalties will not be applied as a result of any other similar rule or 
judicial doctrine, such as the step transaction doctrine; provides a process that Service personnel 
must adhere to before applying the economic substance doctrine; and provides that, if a 
transaction involves a series of connected steps, an examiner who seeks to apply the doctrine to 
individual steps must first seek further guidance from on high. IRS Issues LB&I Directive on 
Codified Economic Substance Doctrine and Penalties, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 15, 2011, 
available at LEXIS, 2011 TNT 137-17; see also Mark A. Luscombe, Tax Trends: IRS Issues 
Economic Substance Guidance, TAXES—THE TAX MAG., Sept. 2011, at 3, 3 (also discussing 
LB&I directive). One commentator has slammed LB&I for issuing the directive and has urged its 
retraction. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: IRS Repeal of the Economic Substance Statute, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 21, 2012, available at LEXIS, 2012 TNT 34-1. 
 248. Cf. McMahon, supra note 203, at 752 (“Except for the new penalty provisions, the 
codification of the economic substance doctrine really should not change legal analysis or 
outcomes very much. It is just old wine in a new bottle.”). 
 249. See Howard E. Abrams, Did Health Care Reform Repeal the Partnership Anti-Abuse 
Rule?, 51 TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM 299 (2010). 
 250. See Coder, supra note 209, at 773 (quoting tax lawyer Cary Pugh: “Companies would 
have to be skirting close to the line for the statutory changes to matter.”). 
 251. See McMahon, supra note 203, at 753 (“If the raison d’être for the transaction, or the 
insertion of an unnecessary element in a transaction that otherwise did have a business purpose, 
was tax avoidance, the economic substance doctrine will loom large.”). 
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V.  ANTI-AVOIDANCE DOCTRINES AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
Even if Congress had not acted to codify the economic substance doctrine, 
the Internal Revenue Service might be able to codify other aspects of anti-
avoidance doctrines through regulations.252 (It is clear that “economic 
substance” does not constitute the universe of these doctrines.253) 
The Service probably does not have authority to issue a general anti-
avoidance rule that would apply across the board, it has not tried to do so, and, 
after economic substance codification, that would be a peculiar thing even to 
contemplate. But the Service might have (or at least claim) authority to do so 
in particular areas. That is what happened in the mid-1990s in partnership 
taxation. 
The first section in the subchapter of the Internal Revenue Code that deals 
with partnerships—§ 701—provides simply that “[a] partnership as such shall 
not be subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on 
business as partners shall be liable for income tax only in their separate or 
individual capacities.”254 
No surprise there. It is a premise of American taxation that partnerships are 
not income-taxpaying entities. Instead, items of income are treated as earned 
by the partners and are taxed currently to them. Section 701 provides no details 
on the implementation of the principles of that section; that is what the rest of 
subchapter K does. 
In 1995, the Service finalized a so-called “anti-abuse rule,” in the form of a 
regulation, under the authority of § 701. In general, the regulation provides 
that, for arrangements that are not “consistent with the intent of subchapter K,” 
the Service has power to recast transactions, to treat persons not as partners, 
and even, in egregious cases, to ignore the existence of a partnership.255 
The key concept, the “intent of subchapter K,” has three components: that 
a partnership be bona fide and enter into transactions with a “substantial 
business purpose”; that the form of any transaction satisfy substance-over-form 
principles; and that, in general, the partnership operations and the 
arrangements between partnership and partners properly reflect income.256 The 
 
 252. One reader of an earlier draft questioned my use of the term “codification” to refer to 
regulations as well as congressional enactments. I use the term to distinguish these rules from 
those developed judicially, and I note that regulations become part of the Code of Federal 
Regulations. 
 253. See supra text accompanying note 181. 
 254. I.R.C. § 701 (2006). 
 255. Because of limited liability companies, which generally combine corporate 
characteristics with partnership tax treatment, partnership taxation may be more important today 
than its sexier older brother, corporate taxation. For an exhaustive treatment of the regulations, 
see James B. Sowell, The Partnership Anti-Abuse Rules: Where Have We Been and Where Are 
We Going?, TAXES—THE TAX MAGAZINE, Mar. 2011, at 69. 
 256. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a) (1995). 
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regulation provides examples to illustrate arrangements that are abusive and 
others that are not. On the who-could-have-thought-otherwise? front, the use of 
a partnership, which avoids entity level tax and therefore almost certainly has 
tax avoidance as one of its purposes, is not ipso facto abusive. It is obviously 
consistent with the intent of subchapter K to use a partnership.257 
The regulation contains a large amount of substance-over-form and other 
traditional anti-avoidance language. Because those powers were always 
available to taxing authorities, however, what, if anything, does codification 
add? For one thing, the regulation makes it clear that anti-avoidance doctrines 
are the law in partnership taxation, so that, as discussed earlier, judges 
reluctant to impose those doctrines now have authority to do so. And, even if it 
merely reinforces old law, the regulation could have an incremental deterrent 
effect on those contemplating aggressive planning. 
But the regulation may add something substantive as well. The regulation 
says the doctrines that may be invoked by tax officials are not limited to the 
generally known ones,258 and Professor Alan Gunn found a new anti-abuse 
standard in the “intent of subchapter K”: 
A transaction can be abusive without running afoul of any of the traditional 
anti-avoidance doctrines; that is, it can have a business purpose and substance, 
its substance and form can coincide, and yet it yields a tax result that no 
sensible legislator would have approved of if the transaction had been called to 
the legislator’s attention when the statute was drafted.259 
Much of the regulation is flawed, in Gunn’s view, but the “concept of ‘abuse,’ 
distinct from other anti-avoidance doctrines,” is potentially powerful.260 
It is indeed, but Professor Gunn might have found more in the regulation 
than the drafters intended261 (and more, for that matter, than the drafters had 
authority to include). As Professor Lawrence Zelenak pointed out, although the 
regulation is titled an “anti-abuse rule,” the words “abuse” and “abusive” are 
 
 257. See id. § 1.701-2(d). 
 258. See id. §§ 1.701-2(i), 1.701-2(d) (“[I]n addition to possibly challenging the transaction 
under applicable judicial principles and statutory authorities, . . . the Commissioner can recast the 
transaction as appropriate under . . . this section.”). As critics noted, this calls into question the 
Service’s authority to issue the regulation. I.R.C. § 701 delegates no explicit power to do so, and 
the regulation’s principles have a tenuous connection to that section. 
 259. Gunn, supra note 28, at 160. 
 260. Id. Gunn provides an example in which S corporation rules lead to preposterous results. 
The case “is abusive not because it calls for a bad interpretation of the relevant Code section (it 
does not), but because it seeks to use a Code section for a purpose its drafters could not plausibly 
be thought to have contemplated.” Id. at 163. 
 261. He admits that “[o]nly three of the regulation[‘s] seven listed factors aim directly at 
abuse, as distinct from ‘substance over form’ or mere suspicion.” Id. at 166. 
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not used in the text.262 And the drafters emphasized that “the fundamental 
principles reflected in the regulation are consistent with the established legal 
doctrines.”263 
Whether or not Gunn’s principle really can be found in the regulation,264 or 
in other regulations projects, it is a wonderful concept that—one way or 
another—ought to be applied generally. I earlier pondered whether a statutory 
or regulatory provision that used language like Gunn’s would work.265 
However we answer that question, it remains the case that no statutory system 
should ever be interpreted in a way that leads to absurd results unless the 
legislature clearly intended the absurdity. 
VI.  DISCLOSURE 
If substantive disallowance rules augmented by anti-avoidance doctrines 
cannot prevent shelters, and that seemed to be the case, particularly before 
codification of the economic substance doctrine, it is not surprising that 
American attention turned to a disclosure regime.266 Indeed, some 
commentators, like Peter Canellos, believe this is where efforts should be 
concentrated: “The key to deterrence for all classes of tax shelters is reporting 
and penalties. To fight what amounts to audit lottery and to nip schemes in the 
bud, airtight, focused, prompt, and efficient disclosure rules are required.”267 
Disclosure cannot work to control avoidance by itself, of course. Unless 
substantive rules are in place that would reach (or might reach) disclosed 
transactions, disclosure does nothing to disinfect the system—except, perhaps, 
for a few transactions that “work” for tax purposes, but the content of which is 
so embarrassing that secrecy is desired for non-tax reasons.268 
 
 262. Lawrence Zelenak, Codifying Anti-Avoidance Doctrines and Controlling Corporate Tax 
Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 177, 178 (2001). For that matter, it is more like a “standard” than a 
“rule.” 
 263. T.D. 8588, 1995-1 C.B. 112. 
 264. Practitioner James Sowell conceded that the regulation “would appear to reach beyond 
transactions that lack economic substance or that violate other judicial doctrines. But it should 
not.” Sowell, supra note 255, at 103. This is because of the increased confusion that would result. 
And the confusion would be unnecessary, he suggests, in that the Service had been successful 
anyway in attacking aggressive partnership structures and that, with codification of the economic 
substance doctrine, “the partnership anti-abuse rules now do little more than add an additional and 
unnecessary argument in pursuing aggressive partnership transactions.” Id. 
 265. See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text. 
 266. See generally Alan Granwell & Sarah McGonigle, US Tax Shelters: A UK Reprise?, 
2006 BRIT. TAX REV. 170. 
 267. Canellos, supra note 20, at 69–70; see also Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice Before the 
Return: The Case for Raising Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX REV. 
583, 612 (2006) (“Lack of disclosure is key to taxpayers’ ability to exploit the audit lottery.”). 
 268. That is not a contentless proposition, but, since we ordinarily are talking about disclosure 
to tax officials, not to the public, the effect may be limited. For example, it might be publicly 
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Although critics have concluded that disclosure is misguided (about which, 
more later), Professor Mark Gergen has argued that the strategy for deterring 
corporate tax shelters—“monitoring tax shelter activity, blacklisting new 
shelters when they are identified, and pursuing users of blacklisted shelters 
through promoters of the shelters along side [sic] more conventional audit 
techniques”269—can be effective. Tweaking is required as conditions change, 
to be sure, but disclosure can have an effect. 
The disclosure rules mandated by Congress and the Service have several 
goals.270 Two are compliance and deterrence, of course. And, if the mass of 
material sent to Washington can be sifted in a manageable way, disclosure can 
help authorities (particularly the Office of Tax Shelter Analysis, made up of 
experts “dedicated to identifying and shutting down tax shelter 
transactions”271) learn about new avoidance strategies and act accordingly.272 
This is not the place for a line-by-line discussion of the rules, but a few 
highlights are in order. (The penalties for noncompliance are obviously an 
important part of the system. 273) 
 
embarrassing for a taxpayer to enter into a transaction with a foreign entity using child labor, but 
disclosure of that fact is not going to result from any tax reporting obligations. 
 269. Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence: Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 255, 
255 (2002). 
 270. It is impossible to come up with a precise starting date for the disclosure regime because 
it developed as a combination of statutory and regulatory changes. The Service was requiring 
disclosure of some transactions before the concept of “reportable transaction” had been fully 
developed. 
 271. Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter 
Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 1002 (2006). 
 272. Another recent effort to increase transparency is the requirement, imposed by the 
Internal Revenue Service on its own, that corporate taxpayers above a certain size (total assets 
exceeding $100 million for 2010 and 2011 tax years, with that figure declining to $50 million for 
the next two years, and reaching $10 million for 2014 and subsequent tax years) disclose on a 
schedule (UTP) included with their tax return any “uncertain tax positions.” In general, those are 
return positions for which a taxpayer has created reserves that are reflected in audited financial 
statements. The financial reporting requirement that reserves be created to protect against 
potential, additional tax liability was imposed by the so-called FIN-48 rules. See ACCOUNTING 
FOR UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES, FASB Interpretation No. 48 (Financial Accounting 
Standards Bd. 2006); IRS Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7 I.R.B. 408; IRS Announcement 2010-
17, 2010-13 I.R.B. 515; IRS Announcement 2010-30, 2010-19 I.R.B. 668; IRS Announcement 
2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428; IRS, 2011 Instructions for Schedule UTP, at 1–2, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120utp.pdf. 
 273. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6707A (2006) (penalty for not disclosing reportable transaction on 
returns); id. § 6707 (penalty on material advisors for not accurately disclosing reportable 
transaction); id. § 6708 (penalty on material advisors for not maintaining or supplying investor 
lists); id. § 6700 (penalty on promoters of abusive shelters); id. § 6662(a) (accuracy-related 
penalty for understatements of tax liability); id. § 6662A (accuracy-related penalty for 
understatements associated with reportable transactions). 
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Participants: return disclosure. A taxpayer that participates in a 
“reportable transaction,” as defined below, is required to attach a form to its 
tax return describing, among other things, the “expected tax treatment and all 
potential tax benefits expected to result from the transaction, . . . any tax result 
protection . . . [and] sufficient detail for the [Service] to be able to understand 
the tax structure of the reportable transaction and the identity of all parties 
involved.”274 This requirement increases the probability that a taxpayer that has 
engaged in a suspect transaction will have its return scrutinized and, if items 
relating to the transaction fail scrutiny, will be subject to penalties. 
In addition, if taxpayers have to disclose questionable return positions, 
they are less likely to participate in reportable transactions at all. Disclosure is 
not an admission that a taxpayer’s reporting of a transaction is wrong,275 but it 
is like tattooing “audit me” on one’s forehead or corporate logo (or so a 
participant might fear). 
Material advisors. As a result of statutory changes in 2004, “material 
advisors” also must disclose “any reportable transaction” about which they 
advise.276 (By requiring both taxpayers and material advisors to disclose the 
same transactions, the disclosure regime is “[r]edundant by design.”277) The 
term “material advisor” is broadly defined. It includes any person “who 
provides any material aid, assistance, or advice with respect to organizing, 
managing, promoting, selling, implementing, insuring, or carrying out any 
reportable transaction, and . . . who [as a result] directly or indirectly derives 
gross income in excess of the threshold amount.”278 As with return disclosure, 
the transaction and its potential tax benefits must be described.279 
List maintenance. An advisor is also required to maintain a list of those “to 
whom [the] advisor acted as a material advisor with respect to such 
[reportable] transaction,” and to provide the list to authorities “upon written 
request.”280 List maintenance is directed not so much at advisors (although 
 
 274. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(d) (as amended in 2010); see I.R.S Form 8886, Reportable 
Transaction Disclosure Statement (OMB No. 1545-1800) (Rev. Mar. 2011), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8886.pdf. 
 275. “The fact that a transaction is a reportable transaction shall not affect the legal 
determination of whether the taxpayer’s treatment of the transaction is proper.” Treas. Reg. § 
1.6011-4(a) (as amended in 2010). 
 276. I.R.C. § 6111 (2006). 
 277. Granwell & McGonigle, supra note 266, at 173. 
 278. I.R.C. § 6111(b)(1)(A). That amount is $50,000 if “substantially all of the tax benefits” 
from the reportable transaction go to natural persons, otherwise $250,000. Id. § 6111(b)(1)(B). 
 279. Id. § 6111(a). 
 280. Id. § 6112(a), (b)(1); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1 (2007) (providing that each 
material advisor shall maintain a list and furnish it to the IRS upon written request). 
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penalties for noncompliance apply281) as at potential shelter investors who are 
understandably leery of being on a list of that sort. 
Reportable transactions. The taxpayer disclosure, material advisor 
reporting, and list maintenance obligations are all tied to the concept of 
“reportable transaction,” statutorily defined as a “transaction . . . of a type 
which the Secretary determines as having a potential for tax avoidance or 
evasion.”282 In broad outline, as now constituted the concept of “reportable 
transaction” encompasses five categories (often called “filters”), with yet 
another proposed. The categories are not mutually exclusive: 
1. “Listed transactions”: generally those labeled as tax avoidance 
transactions by the Internal Revenue Service in published notices, regulations, 
or other guidance.283 In effect, the Service tells the world it is skeptical (or 
more than skeptical) about the transactions. For example, in 2001 the Service 
listed contingent liability transactions that were similar to the one in Black & 
Decker and were not subject to the statutory fix.284 Marketed products are 
almost certain to be listed; “promotion” has been called a “litmus test” for this 
purpose.285 
2. “Confidential transactions”: ones “offered to a taxpayer under 
conditions of confidentiality and for which the taxpayer has paid an advisor a 
minimum fee” ($50,000 to $250,000, depending on type of taxpayer).286 The 
concern is obvious: transactions kept secret in that way emit an unpleasant 
odor. 
3. “Transactions with contractual protection”: ones requiring that any 
advisor’s fee be returned if all or part of the promised tax results do not 
materialize.287 How confident should anyone be about the merits of a tax 
position if the advisor is on the hook like this? 
4. “Loss transactions”: ones for which a taxpayer claims a loss above a 
threshold amount (e.g., $10 million in one year for a corporation).288 The Black 
& Decker transaction would have fit within this category. Transactions like 
those in Cottage Savings might or might not fit, depending on the nature of the 
taxpayers and the magnitude of the claimed losses. 
 
 281. See I.R.C. § 6708 (2006). 
 282. Id. § 6707A(c)(1). “The term transaction includes all of the factual elements relevant to 
the expected tax treatment of any investment, entity, plan, or arrangement, and includes any series 
of steps carried out as part of a plan.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(1) (as amended in 2010). 
 283. A compiled list of reportable transactions, accurate as of the date of publication, can be 
found in IRS Notice 2009-59, 2009-31 I.R.B. 170, but the list is always a work in progress. 
 284. See IRS Notice 2001-17, supra note 76. 
 285. Morse, supra note 271, at 1004. 
 286. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(3) (as amended in 2010). 
 287. Id. § 1.6011-4(b)(4). 
 288. Id. § 1.6011-4(b)(5). 
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5. “Transactions of interest”: ones identified by the Service through 
published guidance as having the “potential for tax avoidance or evasion,” but 
about which the government has insufficient information to conclude that the 
deals are in fact avoidance or evasion transactions.289 This category, added by 
regulations finalized in July 2007, supplements, and significantly strengthens, 
the listing procedure. 
The five categories do not pick up every transaction that you or I might 
find suspect,290 of course, but they are a good start.291 And the Service has 
issued a proposed regulation that, if finalized, would add to the list “patented 
transactions,” a category of recent, enormous interest.292 (It has been of such 
interest, however, that recent legislation restricting tax strategy patents may 
have made the issue moot.293) In particular, the power to list a newly 
 
 289. Id. § 1.6011-4(b)(6); see also T.D. 9350, 2007-2 C.B. 607 (announcing new final 
regulations that include this category). A list of transactions of interest, accurate as of the date of 
publication, can be found in IRS Notice 2009-55, 2009-31 I.R.B. 170. But as is true with 
reportable transactions generally, see supra note 283, this is always a work in progress. 
 290. Cf. Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2255 
(2004) (“[T]hese . . . largely unrelated filters . . . suggest[] that the IRS lacks a well-defined 
principle for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate transactions.”). 
 291. Transactions with large book-tax differences and those “involving a brief asset holding 
period” (under 46 days) were once reportable as well. The Service decided, however, that a 
schedule accompanying corporate tax returns requires enough data to make further disclosure on 
book-tax differences unnecessary. See IRS Notice 2006-6, 2006-1 C.B. 385. Commentators 
convinced the Service that transactions involving brief holding periods did not need to be 
reported. See T.D. 9350, 2007-2 C.B. 607. 
 292. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(7)(i), 72 Fed. Reg. 54615, 54617 (Sept. 26, 2007) 
(defining “patented transaction” as “a transaction for which a taxpayer pays . . . a fee in any 
amount to a patent holder or the patent holder’s agent for the legal right to use a tax planning 
method that the taxpayer knows or has reason to know is the subject of the patent”). 
Commentators have been nearly unanimous in condemning the patenting of tax planning 
methods, but, for a dissenting view, see Jacob Birnbaum, Why the U.S. Congress Would Be 
Making a Colossal Mistake by Banning Tax Patents, 28 J. TAX’N INVESTMENTS., Spring 2011, at 
59. Practitioner Birnbaum argues, among other things, that patents are not available anyway for 
the sorts of things that bother most folks. Id. at 61. And to the extent that patents are sought for 
questionable processes, the government should be delighted to have the disclosure that the patent 
system provides. Id. at 62. 
 293. Section 14 of the Leahy-Smith American Invents Act, signed by the president on 
September 16, 2011, for purposes of interpreting §§ 102 and 103 of Title 35 of the U.S. Code, 
characterizes any “strategy for reducing, avoiding, or deferring tax liability” as “prior art” and 
therefore unpatentable. Leahy-Smith Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 14, 125 Stat. 284, 327 
(2011). The new rule was effective immediately, and thus applied to any patent application 
pending on or filed on or after September 16. See Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Acting 
Assoc. Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy, to Patent Examining Corps (Sept. 20, 2011), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/best-mode-memo.pdf; John W. 
Hutchinson, Tax Strategy Patents After the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 29 J. TAX’N 
INVESTMENTS, Spring 2012, at 35. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
50 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1 
discovered transaction, or to denote a transaction as one “of interest,” permits 
the government to act fast, without having to wait to rule definitively on the 
merits. (A published notice listing a transaction might include definitive, 
substantive analysis, as did the one listing contingent liability transactions, but 
it need not do so.294 Denoting a transaction as “of interest” signals that the 
Service does not yet know enough to rule definitively.) 
The effect of listing is likely to be immediate on investors that are not 
already participating in such a transaction: they will have been warned that 
they should probably look elsewhere for tax thrills. The effect of denominating 
a transaction as “of interest” may not be quite so stark, but it would deter most 
investors. (It would deter me.) 
In the abstract, the deterrent effects of disclosure are obvious, but the 
system—inevitably?—does not work as smoothly as hoped.295 And critics 
worry that the government will overemphasize disclosure to the exclusion of 
other methods. Professor Weisbach has repeatedly stressed the need to reform 
substantive law.296 Requiring disclosure of a transaction that is deemed to meet 
legal requirements—like a Black & Decker deal (maybe) before Congress 
acted or a Cottage Savings deal today—seems pointless.297 
Professor Weisbach is right that disclosure by itself will not do the job, but 
he may underestimate its positive effects. Professor Ronald Pearlman has 
stressed the importance of “tax return disclosure” because, he argues, many 
shelters do not “work.”298 Make taxpayers disclose suspect positions that might 
turn out to be losers, and disclosure can disinfect the system, without 
Congress’s having to change substantive law. 
Even if suspect transactions do “work”—so that a challenged taxpayer 
would ultimately prevail—not many taxpayers have a “Bring it on!” attitude. 
Tell them disclosure is required, that the government is curious, and most will 
do tax planning in other ways. For example, disclosure directed at promoted 
shelters has largely shut those shelters down, whatever legal arguments might 
 
 294. See IRS Notice 2001-17, supra note 76 (providing alternative rationales for contingent 
liabilities’ reducing stock basis in a Black & Decker-like transaction). 
 295. Dean Schizer argues that advisors have an incentive to do no more than the minimum to 
avoid penalties. Moreover, “the tax bar is highly motivated to undermine the effectiveness of [the 
disclosure] effort[,]” Schizer, supra note 11, at 369, through, for example, interpreting a 
reportable transaction hypertechnically and burying the government in paper. Id. at 370. 
 296. See Weisbach, supra note 6, at 78. 
 297. See id. (“Many of these transactions work under current law. . . . [T]hey do not rely on 
the audit lottery. Disclosure and penalties would not stop them.”). In its notice listing contingent 
liability shelters, however, the Service made it clear that, in its view, those transactions did not 
work. See Notice 2001-17, supra note 76. 
 298. Ronald A. Pearlman, Demystifying Disclosure: First Steps, 55 TAX L. REV. 289, 291–93 
(2002). 
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have been marshaled on their behalf.299 (And Professor Weisbach concedes 
disclosure’s potential as a way for the government to learn about new 
avoidance strategies.300) 
Two other skeptics, Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak, argued in 2005 
that “disclosure is not a solution” in part because “the government has lost at 
least as many audited tax shelter cases as it has won.”301 But the government’s 
win-loss record in litigation, which improved anyway after Chirelstein and 
Zelenak wrote those words,302 is not a good measure of disclosure’s effect. A 
possibility of prevailing on the merits is not going to convince many taxpayers 
to go ahead with a transaction that must be disclosed. A fifty-percent chance of 
success in litigation for a transaction that might escape discovery is much more 
appealing than a fifty-percent chance of success for a transaction the 
government knows about. Disclosure increases the expected cost of any 
penalties, as well as the expected cost of defending questionable return 
positions, and higher expected costs affect behavior. 
I respect the critics who doubt the efficacy of disclosure, but it is hard to 
imagine that disclosure is not helping control abusive behavior. Yes, 
complexity and costs of complying with (or circumventing) the disclosure 
rules remain concerns. Lawyers are making good livings deciphering those 
rules—parsing the definition of “minimum fee” or whatever—and that is not 
the best use of America’s human capital. 
One nevertheless hopes that, once the rules have become part of the 
landscape, compliance concerns will largely disappear. Determining whether a 
transaction is reportable is generally not going to be hard for most taxpayers 
and advisors. And the cost of planning around disclosure rules will itself be 
enough of a disincentive to deter some undesirable behavior. 
VII.  IMPROVING ADVISORS’ BEHAVIOR 
Another anti-avoidance mechanism in vogue is, in Professor Richard 
Lavoie’s phrase, to “[c]o-opt[] the [t]ax [b]ar into [d]issuading [c]orporate 
[t]ax [s]helters.”303 Congress long ago authorized the Secretary of the Treasury 
to “regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the [Internal 
 
 299. See Morse, supra note 271, at 1003 (“[L]abeling promoted tax shelter transactions as 
deviant behavior has . . . translated into an anti-tax shelter compliance norm.”). High-profile 
prosecution of promoters has also obviously helped in the shutdown. See Granwell & McGonigle, 
supra note 266, at 171–73. 
 300. See Weisbach, supra note 6, at 78 (“The benefit of disclosure comes only if the 
government is willing to change, or at least clarify, the law.”); Weisbach, supra note 18, at 226. 
 301. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 116, at 1942. 
 302. See Simmonds, supra note 151, at 913. 
 303. Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading 
Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43, 43 (2001). 
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Revenue Service],”304 and regulations known as “Circular 230” followed in 
1966—with many subsequent revisions.305 “Practice before the . . . Service” is 
defined so broadly—including not only physical appearances, but also 
communications, preparing and filing documents, and other activities306—that 
complying with the requirements of Circular 230 is a sine qua non for a tax 
practitioner.307 
For present purposes, the important parts of Circular 230 are the rules 
governing opinions that practitioners may give about tax shelters. (The term 
“tax shelter” is no longer used in the regulations, but the idea survives, at least 
as of this writing, in rules, promulgated in 2004, that govern “covered 
opinions.”308) Regulate the content of opinions and constrain the way potential 
investors can use those opinions, and shaky transactions may lose their 
underpinnings.309 
The bar has been critical of Circular 230 in part because many of the rules 
are directed at the bar. And some of the criticism is justified. Well-motivated 
though it is, Circular 230 contains a lot of regulatory overkill. Anyone 
receiving emails from American tax lawyers must chuckle at the attached 
disclaimers. Following a message like “Lunch at 12:30?” comes the 
boilerplate—like “IRS Circular 230 Notice: To comply with US Treasury 
regulations, we advise you that any US federal tax advice included in this 
communication is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, to 
avoid any US federal tax penalties or to promote, market, or recommend to 
another party any transaction or matter.”310 All you want is a hamburger, and 
you get a lecture on Circular 230. 
 
 304. 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2006). 
 305. See 31 C.F.R. § 10 (2011) [hereinafter Circular 230]. 
 306. Id. § 10.2(a)(4). 
 307. Return preparation, which need not be done by lawyers, accountants, or enrolled agents, 
has its own set of rules. See Circular 230, supra note 305, §§ 10.7(e), 10.22(a), 10.34; I.R.C. § 
6694 (2006). Some of the rules were amended by T.D. 9527, 2011-27 I.R.B. 1. 
 308. Other parts of Circular 230 have been amended more recently. See T.D. 9527, supra note 
307 (dealing with tax returns and tax return preparers). Proposed amendments, issued on 
September 17, 2012, would make dramatic changes to Circular 230, including eliminating the 
concept of “covered opinion.” See RIN 1545-BF96, 77 Fed. Reg. 57055 (Sept. 17, 2012).  
 309. In making the intriguing argument that knowledge of the tax law is sometimes 
undesirable, Professor Weisbach suggests that “shelters likely fit into the class of cases where 
knowledge is undesirable” because “[t]hey are cases where the law is likely suboptimal.” 
Weisbach, supra note 229, at 35. As a result, “one way to see [Circular 230] is as an attempt by 
the government to limit or make more expensive access to knowledge of the tax law where such 
knowledge is undesirable.” Id. 
 310. The disclaimers are intended to ensure that the email is not a “reliance opinion” or a 
“marketed opinion,” as defined below. If the proposed regulations noted in supra note 308 are 
finalized, these disclaimers should disappear from email. 
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For clients (and others who might see an opinion, such as offerees of a 
marketed shelter), the big concern is protection against penalties. The risk of 
taking an aggressive position on one’s tax return is not only that, if the position 
is disallowed, unpaid tax plus interest will be due; it is also that penalties might 
be imposed. Some penalties do not apply if a taxpayer can demonstrate it acted 
in “good faith,” with “reasonable cause” for the return position.311 Because the 
codification of economic substance contains strict-liability penalties,312 no 
opinion of counsel will mitigate the penalty for a transaction deemed to lack 
economic substance. In other contexts, however, where an opinion of counsel 
might matter, an opinion will provide penalty protection—“reasonable 
cause”—only if Circular 230’s requirements have been satisfied.313 
For tax lawyers,314 providing a rosy opinion about a shaky tax position was 
always risky—damage to reputation, possible malpractice, and the like—but 
Circular 230 increases the stakes.315 Violating Circular 230 can lead to the tax 
lawyer’s losing practice privileges before the Service and to other sanctions.316 
(These rules are enforced by an Office of Professional Responsibility in the 
Treasury Department, which, in egregious cases, intends to pursue public 
disciplinary proceedings.317) Circular 230 also pushes firms to police 
themselves, providing for sanctioning bosses who do not adequately supervise 
their underlings.318 
The brief overview of Circular 230 that follows should demonstrate why 
the rules can have significant effect on written advice about any tax shelter—
the advice is likely to be a “covered opinion”—but knowing the particulars is 
unnecessary to understand the underlying ideas. The content of documents, 
including emails, that provide tax advice is serious business under Circular 
230. Because of Circular 230, lawyers should be much less willing than was 
true in the past to give disclaimer-free, favorable written advice about shelters. 
As a result, taxpayers are much less likely to get the opinions they require to 
take aggressive positions on their tax returns while avoiding penalty risk. No 
favorable opinion, no penalty protection, and, often therefore, no shelter.319 
 
 311. See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1), (d)(1) (2006). 
 312. See supra Part IV. 
 313. See infra notes 320–27 and accompanying text. 
 314. I will refer to lawyers, although the term “practitioners” in Circular 230 includes 
accountants and others as well. See Circular 230, supra note 305, § 10.0. 
 315. See Charles A. Rose, Note, The Tax Lawyer’s Dilemma: Recent Developments Heighten 
Tax Lawyer Responsibilities and Liabilities, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 258, 278. 
 316. See Circular 230, supra note 305, § 10.50; Morse, supra note 271, at 991–92. 
 317. See Morse, supra note 271, at 992. 
 318. Circular 230, supra note 305, § 10.36. 
 319. See generally LINDA GALLER & MICHAEL B. LANG, REGULATION OF TAX PRACTICE 
103–10 (2010). It bears repeating, yet again, that with a transaction to which the codified 
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Requirements for “covered opinions.” If opinions are “covered,” they must 
satisfy requirements that make these opinions “elaborate and expensive 
exercises.”320 
1. The lawyer must use reasonable efforts to identify and ascertain 
relevant facts; not base the opinion on unreasonable factual assumptions; and 
not base the opinion on any factual statement the lawyer knows (or should 
know) is incorrect or incomplete.321 
2. He must relate applicable law to relevant facts; generally not assume 
favorable resolution of any significant tax issue or otherwise base the opinion 
on unreasonable assumptions, representations, or conclusions; and not include 
internally inconsistent analyses or conclusions in the opinion.322 
3. He must generally consider all significant federal tax issues and 
provide a conclusion as to the likelihood that the taxpayer would prevail on the 
merits on each significant issue323 (not taking audit-lottery considerations into 
account in the evaluation).324 
4. He must provide an overall conclusion as to the federal tax treatment of 
the transaction, or, if that cannot be done, provide reasons why.325 
If any covered opinion does not reach a more-likely-than-not conclusion 
(i.e., a confidence level of more than fifty percent) for any significant tax issue, 
that fact must be disclosed prominently in the opinion.326 In addition, the 
opinion must prominently note that, for any such low-confidence issues, “the 
opinion was not written, and cannot be used by the taxpayer, for the purpose of 
avoiding penalties that may be imposed on the taxpayer.”327 
“Covered opinion.” Given those requirements, a covered opinion is 
obviously not something that should be dashed off at the coffee shop; it is 
supposed to be a painstaking exercise. And the term includes much more than 
the formal documents traditionally called legal opinions. It can include almost 
 
economic substance doctrine is relevant, the penalty is a strict-liability one, for which a favorable 
opinion of counsel would provide no penalty protection anyway. 
 320. Morse, supra note 271, at 991. Written opinions that are not “covered” must still satisfy 
some specific requirements, and in no event are lawyers to give written advice that takes audit-
lottery possibilities into account. Circular 230, supra note 305, § 10.37. 
 321. Circular 230, supra note 305, § 10.35(c)(1). 
 322. Id. § 10.35(c)(2). 
 323. Id. § 10.35(c)(3). In some cases, a “limited scope opinion” may address selected tax 
issues and make factual and legal assumptions that otherwise would not be permitted—assuming 
that appropriate disclosure is made about the opinion’s limited scope. However, marketed 
opinions and opinions issued for listed transactions and for transactions where a principal purpose 
is tax avoidance or evasion can never be limited scope opinions. See id. § 10.35(c)(3)(v), (e)(3). 
 324. Id. § 10.35(c)(3)(iii). That is, it is not appropriate for a lawyer to give a don’t-worry-
about-it opinion to the effect that the auditing agent is unlikely to notice the suspect transaction. 
 325. Id. § 10.35(c)(4). 
 326. Circular 230, supra note 305, § 10.35(e)(4)(i). 
 327. Id. § 10.35(e)(4)(ii). 
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any written advice, including electronic communications,328 relating to federal 
tax issues arising from three related, but different, types of transactions: (1) a 
“listed” or substantially similar transaction, as the term was used in the 
disclosure discussion;329 (2) “[a]ny partnership or other entity, any investment 
plan or arrangement, . . . the principal purpose of which is the avoidance or 
evasion of any tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code,” and (3) a “reliance 
opinion,” a “marketed opinion,” or an opinion “subject to conditions of 
confidentiality” or “subject to contractual protection,” if the opinion relates to 
“[a]ny partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement,” and a 
“significant purpose” (a lower standard than the principal purpose test in 
category (2)) for the arrangement is tax avoidance or evasion.330 
All of that is a mouthful, but one thing is clear: that group of transactions 
includes almost anything that might be considered a tax shelter. Remember 
that, although tax evasion is illegal, avoidance—planning in permissible ways 
to reduce one’s tax bill—is not. Indeed, it is what tax professionals help their 
clients do.331 If tax avoidance is at least a “significant purpose”—and, for a 
shelter, that is obviously (and tautologically) the case—the rules applicable to 
covered opinions are going to apply. (In both Black & Decker and Cottage 
Savings, for example, tax avoidance was the only purpose for the 
transactions.332) So, for example, if a “reliance opinion”—one that reaches a 
conclusion, at a confidence level of more than fifty percent, that one or more 
significant tax issues would be resolved in the taxpayer’s favor—is issued for a 
significant purpose transaction, that opinion is “covered.”333 
A “marketed” opinion—one to be used by a person outside the firm in 
“promoting, marketing or recommending a partnership or other entity,” etc.—
is also going to be “covered” if tax avoidance is at least a significant purpose 
 
 328. Under current rules, it is some small comfort to practitioners that oral communications 
are not covered (but oral advice would not provide penalty protection anyway). In addition, 
preliminary written advice to a client during an engagement is not “covered” if the practitioner is 
expected later to provide written advice that will be a “covered opinion.” Id. § 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(A). 
But see supra note 308 (noting proposed regulations that would do away with the concept of 
“covered opinions”). 
 329. See supra notes 283–85 and accompanying text. 
 330. Circular 230, supra note 305, § 10.35(b)(2)(i). 
 331. Use of a partnership, say, which avoids entity-level taxation and permits pass-through of 
losses, presumably always has tax avoidance as at least a significant purpose, and in many cases it 
is the principal one. 
 332. That was stipulated for summary judgment purposes in Black & Decker, see supra note 
45 and accompanying text, although, with codification of the economic substance doctrine, such 
stipulations are unlikely today. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. In Cottage Savings, 
the transaction would not have proceeded without the hope that it would be treated differently for 
tax and financial accounting purposes. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 333. Circular 230, supra note 305, § 10.35(b)(2)(i), (b)(4)(i). 
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for the transaction.334 In addition to the other rules applicable to covered 
opinions, Circular 230 requires that any marketed opinion come to a more-
likely-than-not conclusion (a more than fifty percent likelihood of success) 
about every significant tax issue and about the overall tax effect of the 
transaction.335 In addition, a marketed opinion must include a disclosure that it 
was written to support the marketing effort, and that recipients of the opinion 
should consult their own tax advisors about the transaction described.336 High 
standards indeed. 
Disclaimers. Circular 230 seems to provide a way around some of the 
stringent rules through disclaimers (as in emails), but the benefits of 
disclaiming are chimerical. For example, written advice that includes a 
disclaimer stating that the advice may not be used to protect against penalties 
does not count as a reliance opinion.337 From the lawyer’s standpoint, that 
seems to be good; the requirements for covered opinions might not have to be 
satisfied. But a taxpayer who is told that he is not entitled to rely on the 
opinion will not be in a good mood: the disclaimer works for Circular 230 
purposes by making the opinion essentially worthless as penalty protection. 
Similarly, what would otherwise be a marketed opinion will not be subject 
to the marketed-opinion rules if it contains a disclaimer—that it is not to be 
used for penalty protection, that the recipient should consult its own tax 
advisors, and so on.338 The effect is that an opinion that will do no good in 
marketing anyway—because nobody can rely on it—need not be treated as a 
“marketed opinion.” The opinion might be an interesting intellectual exercise, 
but, for penalty (and therefore marketing) purposes, it will not be worth the 
paper it is written on, or the electrons it is written with. 
* * * * * 
Circular 230’s requirements are far-reaching, but not as far-reaching as 
was the case before codification of economic substance imposed strict-liability 
penalties that, by definition, are unaffected by legal opinions. The economic 
substance doctrine is not relevant to all shelter transactions, however, and, no 
matter how broad the scope of Circular 230, it will not eliminate the issuance 
of favorable opinions for tax shelters. 
For example, I think the result in Cottage Savings was too good to be true, 
but I would be willing to give an overwhelmingly favorable opinion about a 
similar transaction today. My opinion would be “covered”; the “principal,” 
indeed the only, purpose of the transaction would be tax avoidance. But a very 
 
 334. Id. § 10.35(b)(2)(i), (b)(5)(i). 
 335. Id. § 10.35(c)(3)(iv), (c)(4)(ii), 
 336. Id. § 10.35(e)(2). 
 337. See id. § 10.35(b)(4)(ii). 
 338. Circular 230, supra note 305, § 10.35(b)(5). 
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favorable opinion could be safely issued with a Supreme Court case directly on 
point. (For that reason, the transaction should also be deemed outside the scope 
of economic substance codification.339) I might be bothered by the 
hypertechnical interpretation applied in Cottage Savings, but, if the Court says 
the law is X, the law is X—unless and until Congress intervenes. As I noted 
earlier, taxpayers are entitled to too-good-to-be-true results if that is what 
Congress intended (or is deemed to have intended).340 
In a high percentage of shelter situations not governed by the economic 
substance doctrine, however, the Circular 230 rules should prevent lawyers 
from issuing unqualifiedly favorable opinions, and, without such opinions, 
those proposed shelters will not proceed. If the Office of Professional 
Responsibility is able to meet its enforcement obligations, these rules have 
bite. 
CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE RULES AND DOCTRINES 
If there is a lesson in all of this—and there is, of course—it is that no 
single method of attack on tax shelters is going to be successful. Give too 
much emphasis to economic substance alone, for example, and, as Professor 
Weisbach argues, “shelters themselves may get worse” in that they will 
become more exotic to satisfy the requirement.341 But change substantive rules 
where appropriate, apply anti-avoidance doctrines (including the codified 
economic substance doctrine) forcefully, add in disclosure, make sure lawyers 
are not promising better tax results than are justified, and the system just might 
work—not perfectly, of course, but adequately.342 
The precise mixture of governmental weapons used will have to vary over 
time because the shelter target is a moving one. Some smart people make sure 
of that. In an often-quoted line, the late Marty Ginsburg said that “[t]he tax bar 
is the repository of the greatest ingenuity in America, and given the chance, 
those people will do you in.”343 That is funny—and largely true. 
“Ingenuity” is great, up to a point. It is generally better to have smart tax 
lawyers than dumb ones. But it is even better to have smart, honorable tax 
lawyers. We should not emphasize rules and doctrines to such an extent that 
we ignore the professional norms that guided American tax lawyers for 
decades. 
 
 339. See supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text. 
 340. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
 341. Weisbach, supra note 18, at 237. 
 342. I have largely ignored a factor that should not be ignored: the costs of implementing, and 
complying with, the various methods. In general, it makes no sense to spend $100 to bring in $99 
in revenue. However, we do not have sufficient data to do informed cost-benefit analyses. 
 343. Legislation Relating to Tax-Motivated Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th 
Cong. 90 (1982) (statement of Martin D. Ginsburg). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
58 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1 
One of my colleagues claims that tax lawyers all work for the government. 
That is not true, of course, but tax lawyers are obligated to provide advice in a 
responsible way. It used to be understood, at the better law firms at least, that 
certain things were just not done. Certain types of transactions were not the 
sort that professionals worked on. If that understanding has changed, it needs 
to be resurrected. If it still exists at the better firms, as I think it does—it is one 
thing that makes those firms “better”—it needs to be preserved and extended. 
Recent scholarship recognizes the critical role of the tax lawyer as lawyer 
in curbing abusive behavior—not because anything in Circular 230 applies, but 
because behaving responsibly and exercising good judgment are part of being a 
lawyer. Professor Linda Beale emphasizes that “the basic opinion practices [of 
Circular 230] (e.g., thorough consideration of law and facts, rejection of 
unrealistic assumptions) are not substantially different from that which has 
traditionally been considered good lawyering.”344 Professor Tanina Rostain 
argues that tax lawyers who have moved to accounting firms, which 
technically are not permitted to practice law, might be less inclined to view 
themselves in a professionally appropriate way.345 (What they do, however, 
sometimes looks an awful lot like law practice anyway.) Practitioner Peter 
Canellos notes that, although many shelter “professionals” are lawyers, they do 
not adhere to the standards that guide lawyers generally: “The tax shelter 
professional is a different breed, by experience, temperament, reputation, and 
calling . . . . Tax shelter professionals tend to be specialists rather than 
generalists and often suffer from the specialist’s lack of judgment.”346 And so 
on. 
Encouraging tax lawyers to act as lawyers, as traditionally understood, 
may seem like endorsing apple pie, motherhood, and baseball (without the 
designated hitter). In this context, it also might seem otherworldly. How does 
an academic not engaged in the practice of law (me) have the gall to suggest 
that lawyers ought not to give opinions that depend only on hypertechnical 
readings of authority? After all, refusing to provide an opinion can have 
unhappy economic consequences for a lawyer, and the kids have to eat. 
The disclosure rules and Circular 230 do not define honor, however. And 
the strict-liability penalties associated with economic substance codification do 
not eliminate the pressure for tax lawyers to issue favorable opinions on 
suspect transactions. Whatever the rules, acting honorably is what tax lawyers 
should be doing. 
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